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  <updated>2026-09-29T18:53:42.444413+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54687</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-54687</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T18:53:42.448060+00:00</updated>
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        <p>n8n-nodes-sqlite3 is a node for operating a local SQLite database from n8n. Prior to 1.0.0, nodes/SqliteNode/v1/SqliteV1.node.ts exposes the db_path database file path as a node parameter that permits data expressions from upstream workflow input. A workflow author who maps untrusted input to db_path can allow a remote attacker to select which SQLite file the n8n process opens, enabling traversal outside the intended database location and potentially reading, creating, or overwriting files accessible to the process. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54687"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-q7m3-rhxg-7vxr</id>
    <title>GHSA-q7m3-rhxg-7vxr — n8n-nodes-sqlite3 vulnerable to path traversal via user-controlled database file path (db_path parameter)</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T18:53:42.448207+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: n8n-nodes-sqlite3</p>
<p>## Affected versions
&lt; 1.0.0</p>
<p>## Patched version
1.0.0</p>
<p>## Description
In versions prior to 1.0.0, the SQLite node accepted the database file
path as a direct node parameter visible and editable in the workflow.
A workflow author who mapped untrusted user input to the db_path field
could allow an attacker to control which file was opened by SQLite,
potentially enabling path traversal to read or overwrite arbitrary
files accessible to the n8n process.</p>
<p>The vulnerability requires the workflow author to explicitly wire
untrusted input to the db_path parameter, so it does not affect
standalone deployments where only trusted users author workflows.
However, in multi-tenant or user-facing n8n deployments the risk
is elevated.</p>
<p>Fixed in v1.0.0 by moving the database path into a credential
(v2 node architecture), which is stored server-side and not
controllable by workflow input data.</p>
<p>## References
- Fix commit: 145a887
- Introduced credential-based path: v2 node</p>
<p>## Credits
dyingman1 (role: Reporter)</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-q7m3-rhxg-7vxr"/>
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