Affected: Homebrew: allure

## Summary

The built-in HTTP server started by `allure serve` and `allure open` is vulnerable to path traversal. The server resolves request URI paths directly against the report directory without normalizing or validating that the resolved path stays within the report directory. An attacker who can reach the server can read any file accessible to the Allure process by sending a request containing `../` sequences.

## Details

When `allure serve` or `allure open` is executed, `Commands.setUpServer()` creates an HTTP server with a handler that serves files from the report directory:

**`allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java:325-339`** ```java protected HttpServer setUpServer(final String host, final int port, final Path reportDirectory) throws IOException { final HttpServer server = HttpServer .create(new InetSocketAddress(Objects.isNull(host) ? "localhost" : host, port), 0);

server.createContext("/", exchange -> { final Path resolve = reportDirectory.resolve("." + exchange.getRequestURI().getPath()); // line 330 if (Files.isDirectory(resolve)) { serveFile(exchange, resolve.resolve("index.html")); } else { serveFile(exchange, resolve); } });

return server; } ```

On line 330, the handler constructs a file path by concatenating `"."` with the raw request URI path and resolving it against `reportDirectory`. For a request to `/../../../etc/passwd`:

1. `exchange.getR…

Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. Prior to 2.39.0, the HTTP server started by allure serve and allure open uses URI.getPath() in Commands.setUpServer() in allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java and passes the percent-decoded request path to reportDirectory.resolve() without normalizing the result or confirming that it remains inside that directory. An unauthenticated client that can reach the server can submit parent-directory segments, including percent-encoded segments, and cause serveFile() to return any regular file readable by the Allure process. The server binds to localhost by default, but the --host option can expose it to other systems, and local users, adjacent containers, or browser-origin attacks may reach a local listener. This can disclose credentials, configuration, source code, build secrets, and other CI/CD data. This issue is fixed in version 2.39.0.

Affected: Maven: io.qameta.allure:allure-commandline

## Summary

The built-in HTTP server started by `allure serve` and `allure open` is vulnerable to path traversal. The server resolves request URI paths directly against the report directory without normalizing or validating that the resolved path stays within the report directory. An attacker who can reach the server can read any file accessible to the Allure process by sending a request containing `../` sequences.

## Details

When `allure serve` or `allure open` is executed, `Commands.setUpServer()` creates an HTTP server with a handler that serves files from the report directory:

**`allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java:325-339`** ```java protected HttpServer setUpServer(final String host, final int port, final Path reportDirectory) throws IOException { final HttpServer server = HttpServer .create(new InetSocketAddress(Objects.isNull(host) ? "localhost" : host, port), 0);

server.createContext("/", exchange -> { final Path resolve = reportDirectory.resolve("." + exchange.getRequestURI().getPath()); // line 330 if (Files.isDirectory(resolve)) { serveFile(exchange, resolve.resolve("index.html")); } else { serveFile(exchange, resolve); } });

return server; } ```

On line 330, the handler constructs a file path by concatenating `"."` with the raw request URI path and resolving it against `reportDirectory`. For a request to `/../../../etc/passwd`:

1. `exchange.getR…

Affected: Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: allure, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: allure, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: allure, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: allure, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: allure

Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. Prior to 2.39.0, the HTTP server started by allure serve and allure open uses URI.getPath() in Commands.setUpServer() in allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java and passes the percent-decoded request path to reportDirectory.resolve() without normalizing the result or confirming that it remains inside that directory. An unauthenticated client that can reach the server can submit parent-directory segments, including percent-encoded segments, and cause serveFile() to return any regular file readable by the Allure process. The server binds to localhost by default, but the --host option can expose it to other systems, and local users, adjacent containers, or browser-origin attacks may reach a local listener. This can disclose credentials, configuration, source code, build secrets, and other CI/CD data. This issue is fixed in version 2.39.0.