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  <updated>2026-09-28T14:08:35.475396+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55847</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-55847</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T14:08:35.941880+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. Prior to 2.39.0, the ansi.js helper at allure-generator/src/main/javascript/helpers/ansi.js passes attacker-influenced statusMessage and statusTrace values through AnsiToHtml without HTML escaping and wraps the result in Handlebars SafeString, disabling template auto-escaping in allure-generator/src/main/javascript/blocks/status-details/status-details.hbs. JunitXmlPlugin.java can populate these fields directly from crafted JUnit XML failure messages and traces, and equivalent input flows exist in the TRX, xUnit XML, xctest, and Allure1 and Allure2 plugins. When a user views the affected status details, unescaped markup executes arbitrary JavaScript in the report origin, which can expose report data and compromise sessions associated with that origin. This is an incomplete-fix case because PR 3271 escaped link helpers but did not address the ANSI helper. This issue is fixed in version 2.39.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55847"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gx93-m64w-5m6h</id>
    <title>GHSA-gx93-m64w-5m6h — Allure Report: Stored XSS via unescaped ANSI helper in status message/trace rendering</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T14:08:35.942207+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.qameta.allure:allure-generator</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The `ansi.js` Handlebars helper in allure-generator passes user-controlled `statusMessage` and `statusTrace` values from test result files through the `ansi-to-html` library and wraps the output in Handlebars `SafeString` without HTML escaping. Since `ansi-to-html` does not escape HTML entities by default, an attacker who can influence test result content (e.g., via crafted JUnit XML failure messages) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when anyone views the generated Allure report.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>The vulnerability is an incomplete fix — commit `4c64b19` (PR #3271) fixed XSS in `linky.js` and `text-with-links.js` by adding `escapeExpression()`, but the same pattern in `ansi.js` was not addressed.</p>
<p>**Vulnerable sink** — `allure-generator/src/main/javascript/helpers/ansi.js:10-11`:
```javascript
export default function (input) {
    return new SafeString(ansiConverter.toHtml(input));
};
```</p>
<p>The `AnsiToHtml` constructor at line 4 does not set `escapeForHtml: true`:
```javascript
const ansiConverter = new AnsiToHtml({
    fg: "black",
    bg: "black",
    newline: true,
});
```</p>
<p>The `ansi-to-html` library (v0.7.2) defaults `escapeForHtml` to `false`, meaning HTML entities in the input pass through unchanged. Wrapping the result in `SafeString` tells Handlebars to skip its auto-escaping, so the raw HTML reaches the browser.</p>
<p>**Template usage** — `allure-generator/src/main/javascript/blocks/status-details/status-details.hbs:7,10`:
```handlebars
&lt;pre class="sta…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gx93-m64w-5m6h"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-55847</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-55847</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T14:08:35.942375+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: allure, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: allure, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: allure, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: allure, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: allure</p>
<p>Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. Prior to 2.39.0, the ansi.js helper at allure-generator/src/main/javascript/helpers/ansi.js passes attacker-influenced statusMessage and statusTrace values through AnsiToHtml without HTML escaping and wraps the result in Handlebars SafeString, disabling template auto-escaping in allure-generator/src/main/javascript/blocks/status-details/status-details.hbs. JunitXmlPlugin.java can populate these fields directly from crafted JUnit XML failure messages and traces, and equivalent input flows exist in the TRX, xUnit XML, xctest, and Allure1 and Allure2 plugins. When a user views the affected status details, unescaped markup executes arbitrary JavaScript in the report origin, which can expose report data and compromise sessions associated with that origin. This is an incomplete-fix case because PR 3271 escaped link helpers but did not address the ANSI helper. This issue is fixed in version 2.39.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-55847"/>
  </entry>
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