https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-03T19:10:47.525041+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55887 fkie_cve-2026-55887 2026-10-03T19:10:47.589763+00:00

MCP Gateway allows easy and secure running and deployment of MCP servers. From 0.21.0 until 0.42.2, Docker MCP Gateway YAML-unmarshalled the attacker-controlled io.docker.server.metadata OCI image label into the broad catalog.Server structure for direct docker:// references and catalog snapshot imports in pkg/oci/self_contained.go and pkg/workingset/workingset.go. Runtime-shaping fields including Volumes, User, and ExtraHosts were then appended to the docker run argument vector without an origin allowlist, allowing a malicious image author to request host filesystem or Docker socket mounts and UID 0 execution when a victim selected or pulled the image. This container-creation-time boundary bypass can execute arbitrary code on the host and is not prevented by no-new-privileges because no in-container privilege escalation is required. This issue is fixed in version 0.42.2.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r2xf-7jw5-pjg6 GHSA-r2xf-7jw5-pjg6 — Docker MCP Gateway: Argument injection via OCI image label YAML 2026-10-03T19:10:47.589867+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/docker/mcp-gateway

## Summary

A maliciously crafted OCI image label can inject arbitrary arguments into the `docker run` command line constructed by the MCP Gateway. An attacker who controls an image that the victim references via `docker://`, or that the victim's catalog pulls a snapshot from, can mount the host filesystem, run as UID 0, and execute arbitrary code on the host. ## Details

The `io.docker.server.metadata` OCI image label is YAML-unmarshalled directly into the wide `catalog.Server` struct, which carries runtime-shaping fields (`Volumes`, `User`, `Command`, `ExtraHosts`, `AllowHosts`, `DisableNetwork`, `Env`, `Remote`, `SSEEndpoint`, `OAuth`,`Secrets`, `LongLived`, `Policy`) alongside descriptive fields. Every runtime field carries a YAML tag, so the unmarshal mass-assigns from the attacker-controlled label content; only `Image` is overwritten afterwards. The gateway's container-launch code then appends those fields verbatim as `docker run` flags (`-v`, `-u`, `--add-host`) with no allowlist or origin check, and execs `docker` with the resulting argv.

## Impact A malicious image author can achieve arbitrary code execution as UID 0 on the host of a victim running an affected version of MCP Gateway. Attacker-injected `-v /:/host`, `-u root`, and `-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock` arguments reach the `docker run` invocation that launches the MCP server container, giving the attacker full host filesystem access and root execution. The container/host trust boundary…