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  <updated>2026-09-29T15:27:46.179318+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63642</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-63642</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T15:27:46.212152+00:00</updated>
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        <p>MagicMirror² is an open source modular smart mirror platform. Prior to 2.37.0, checkArticleUrl in defaultmodules/newsfeed/node_helper.js accepts the CHECK_ARTICLE_URL notification through the unauthenticated Socket.IO namespace /newsfeed and performs fetch(url, { method: "HEAD" }) without validating the attacker-controlled URL. The helper returns ARTICLE_URL_STATUS containing the URL and framing result, providing a response and timing oracle that can identify internal hosts and ports and trigger side effects on services that react to HEAD requests. This issue is fixed in version 2.37.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63642"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-998g-7v5w-cr7g</id>
    <title>GHSA-998g-7v5w-cr7g — MagicMirror newsfeed Socket.IO notification allows blind server-side request forgery</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T15:27:46.212277+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: magicmirror</p>
<p># Vulnerability — Blind SSRF via `CHECK_ARTICLE_URL` (MagicMirror² newsfeed)</p>
<p>&gt; Analysis of the PoC `exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js`.
&gt; Target: `newsfeed/node_helper.js` of MagicMirror², socket.io namespace `/newsfeed`.</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>## Identification</p>
<p>| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **PoC file** | `exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js` |
| **Endpoint** | socket.io namespace `/newsfeed`, notification `CHECK_ARTICLE_URL` |
| **Precondition** | reach the mirror's HTTP port (no authentication required) |</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>## Description</p>
<p>The `checkArticleUrl()` function in `newsfeed/node_helper.js` runs `fetch(url, { method: "HEAD" })` with **zero validation** of the URL and returns `ARTICLE_URL_STATUS { url, canFrame }`.</p>
<p>This gives the attacker a **boolean + timing oracle** to map internal hosts and ports: presence, absence, and response time reveal which internal services are alive. It is a "blind-ish" SSRF — the attacker doesn't see the body, but forces the server-side request and observes the effect on the target.</p>
<p>The actual proof is observed **on the target side** (the server-side HEAD shows up in the internal service's log), since the `canFrame` field alone leaks little.</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>## Root cause: unauthenticated socket.io channel + permissive CORS</p>
<p>The socket.io server accepts connections from **any origin** and with **no authentication**:</p>
<p>```js
const io = new Server(server, {
  cors: { origin: /.*$/, credentials: true }
});
```</p>
<p>The `/newsfeed` namespace registers the handler without checking who is conn…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-998g-7v5w-cr7g"/>
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