Issue summary: An established DTLS 1.2 association using an AEAD cipher suite can be terminated by a single unauthenticated datagram whose encrypted fragment is shorter than the mandatory explicit IV and authentication tag overhead.

Impact summary: An attacker who can send a datagram that is routed to an existing DTLS 1.2 association can tear that association down without knowing any key material. This is a Denial of Service limited to the targeted association. There is no memory safety or confidentiality impact.

CWE: CWE-1284: Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input

Description: In TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 every record protected by an AEAD cipher suite carries an explicit IV followed by the ciphertext and an authentication tag. When decrypting such a record the record layer passed the record length to the cipher implementation before checking that the record was long enough to contain the explicit IV and the tag. For a record shorter than that overhead the cipher implementation rejected the impossible length, and the record layer treated this as an internal failure and raised a fatal internal_error alert instead of treating the record as one that failed authentication.

In TLS 1.2 the same record causes a fatal internal_error alert instead of the expected bad_record_mac alert. Since any undecryptable record already terminates a TLS connection, this is a protocol conformance issue rather than a security issue in TLS.

The fix validates the record length against the…

Issue summary: An established DTLS 1.2 association using an AEAD cipher suite can be terminated by a single unauthenticated datagram whose encrypted fragment is shorter than the mandatory explicit IV and authentication tag overhead.

Impact summary: An attacker who can send a datagram that is routed to an existing DTLS 1.2 association can tear that association down without knowing any key material. This is a Denial of Service limited to the targeted association. There is no memory safety or confidentiality impact.

CWE: CWE-1284: Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input

Description: In TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 every record protected by an AEAD cipher suite carries an explicit IV followed by the ciphertext and an authentication tag. When decrypting such a record the record layer passed the record length to the cipher implementation before checking that the record was long enough to contain the explicit IV and the tag. For a record shorter than that overhead the cipher implementation rejected the impossible length, and the record layer treated this as an internal failure and raised a fatal internal_error alert instead of treating the record as one that failed authentication.

In TLS 1.2 the same record causes a fatal internal_error alert instead of the expected bad_record_mac alert. Since any undecryptable record already terminates a TLS connection, this is a protocol conformance issue rather than a security issue in TLS.

The fix validates the record length against the…

openssl: openssl: Denial of Service via excessive memory allocation in CRL distribution point processing openssl: openssl: Traffic amplification Denial of Service via QUIC packet over-accounting openssl: openssl: Denial of Service via inefficient QUIC stream reassembly openssl: OpenSSL: Private key recovery via timing side-channel in generic elliptic curve operations openssl: openssl: Denial of Service via excessive QUIC packet buffer retention openssl: openssl: information disclosure via non-constant-time SM2 scalar multiplication on ARM64 and RISC-V openssl: openssl: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds write during TLS context switch openssl: OpenSSL: Denial of Service via unenforced QUIC connection flow control openssl: openssl: Denial of Service via crafted CMP certificate revocation response openssl: OpenSSL: Denial of Service via undersized DTLS record openssl: OpenSSL: Private key recovery via SM2 timing side-channel openssl: compat-openssl: openssl: Information disclosure via DTLS handshake retransmission openssl: OpenSSL: Denial of Service via unbounded QUIC connection identifier backlog

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: openssl, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: openssl, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: edk2, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: nodejs, Ubuntu:Pro:FIPS:16.04:LTS: openssl, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: openssl, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: openssl1.0, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: edk2, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: nodejs, Ubuntu:Pro:FIPS-updates:18.04:LTS: openssl and 18 more

Issue summary: An established DTLS 1.2 association using an AEAD cipher suite can be terminated by a single unauthenticated datagram whose encrypted fragment is shorter than the mandatory explicit IV and authentication tag overhead. Impact summary: An attacker who can send a datagram that is routed to an existing DTLS 1.2 association can tear that association down without knowing any key material. This is a Denial of Service limited to the targeted association. There is no memory safety or confidentiality impact. CWE: CWE-1284: Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input Description: In TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 every record protected by an AEAD cipher suite carries an explicit IV followed by the ciphertext and an authentication tag. When decrypting such a record the record layer passed the record length to the cipher implementation before checking that the record was long enough to contain the explicit IV and the tag. For a record shorter than that overhead the cipher implementation rejected the impossible length, and the record layer treated this as an internal failure and raised a fatal internal_error alert instead of treating the record as one that failed authentication. In TLS 1.2 the same record causes a fatal internal_error alert instead of the expected bad_record_mac alert. Since any undecryptable record already terminates a TLS connection, this is a protocol conformance issue rather than a security issue in TLS. The fix validates the record length against the expl…