https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-09-28T17:29:18.178953+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-85057 fkie_cve-2026-85057 2026-09-28T17:29:18.213854+00:00

ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.4.13 and 4.16.1, ZITADEL Actions V1 enables the goja Node-compatible require() registry without restricting its filesystem source loader. An organization Action author with ORG_OWNER, org.action.write, and org.flow.write permissions can run JavaScript at OIDC, SAML, and login-flow trigger points and load files readable by the ZITADEL server process. This can disclose mounted configuration and secrets, including credentials stored through ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_LOGINCLIENTPATPATH or ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_MACHINEKEYPATH, and recovered bootstrap credentials can enable escalation from an organization administrator to an instance administrator. The issue affects Actions V1, and host command execution is not established. This issue is fixed in versions 3.4.13 and 4.16.1.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fgmf-7rf8-m6vf GHSA-fgmf-7rf8-m6vf — ZITADEL: Actions V1 sandbox escape: host file read via require() 2026-09-28T17:29:18.214263+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/zitadel/zitadel

### Summary

A vulnerability in ZITADEL Actions V1 allows an organization Action author to read files from the ZITADEL host filesystem through the JavaScript `require()` module loader. On common self-hosted deployments this can be chained to steal bootstrap credentials (including the Login Client PAT) and escalate from a single-tenant organization owner to instance administrator.

### Impact

ZITADEL Actions V1 run custom JavaScript inside the ZITADEL server process at OIDC, SAML, and login-flow trigger points. The runtime enables the goja Node-compatible `require()` registry without restricting the source loader, so Action scripts can load host files readable by the ZITADEL process (notably `.js` and `.json`, and in some cases other file contents via error channels).

An attacker with **ORG_OWNER** on any organization (which includes `org.action.write` and `org.flow.write`) can therefore:

* Read process-readable host files, including configuration or secrets mounted into the API container (for example service-account material, projected secrets, or config carrying sensitive values). * On deployments that follow ZITADEL’s documented bootstrap paths (`ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_LOGINCLIENTPATPATH`, `ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_MACHINEKEYPATH`), recover instance-wide credentials such as the **IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT** PAT or the **IAM_OWNER** service-account key, enabling escalation to full instance control.

This collapses the expected multi-tenant isolation boundary: a tenant organization ad…