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  <updated>2026-09-30T13:37:37.394815+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47233</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-47233 — Admidio: Any logged-in user can delete inventory fields via `mode=field_delete` — incomplete fix of #2024</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T13:37:37.411839+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> admidio</p>
<p>Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Version 5.0.9 added a missing `isAdministratorInventory()` gate to `case 'item_delete':` in `modules/inventory.php`. The same fix was not applied to the sibling `case 'field_delete':` handler, which destroys an entire inventory field definition, cascading to every `adm_inventory_item_data` row that referenced that field and every `adm_inventory_field_options` entry. The handler validates only a session-bound CSRF token; there is no `isAdministratorInventory()` check at the controller level, and `Admidio\Inventory\Entity\ItemField::delete()` does not enforce one at the entity level either (unlike its sibling `ItemField::save()`, which does check `$gCurrentUser-&gt;isAdministrator()`). Any user who can log in to the site can permanently destroy a non-system inventory field by sending one POST. Version 5.0.10 provides an updated fix.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47233"/>
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