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  <updated>2026-10-05T16:44:48.934373+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-62674</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-62674 — Omnigent: Shared Agent Bundle Overwrite Leads to Authenticated Runner RCE</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T16:44:48.951757+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> omnigent-ai omnigent</p>
<p>Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent checks LEVEL_EDIT permission for a session but does not reject a bound shared or template agent whose agent.session_id is None. An authenticated user with edit access to a session can replace that shared agent bundle through omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py, add a stdio MCP server, and cause later sessions that use the shared agent to launch an attacker-controlled command through omnigent/tools/mcp.py. The command executes with the Omnigent runner process permissions and can expose files, credentials, workspace data, internal services, and runner availability. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-62674"/>
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