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  <updated>2026-10-06T09:51:28.692638+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-77956</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-77956 — EEx template evaluation of prompt content in AshAi enables remote code execution</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T09:51:28.694326+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> ash-project ash_ai</p>
<p>Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection) vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a remote, unauthenticated client to execute arbitrary Elixir code.</p>
<p>AshAi.Actions.Prompt evaluates prompt content through EEx.eval_string/2. The documented prompt: fn input, context -&gt; ... end form lets the prompt content be built from action arguments, so when a prompt action's text incorporates request data, that attacker-controlled text is compiled and run as an EEx template (Elixir source). Content such as &lt;%= System.cmd(...) %&gt; therefore executes on the server before any model request is made, requiring no authentication beyond reaching a prompt action. The fix stops evaluating function-supplied prompt content as EEx; only statically configured templates are evaluated.</p>
<p>This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.0.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-77956"/>
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