Affected: Homebrew: redocly-cli

### Impact

An OpenAPI or AsyncAPI description could make the `split` command write files outside the chosen output directory, on the machine of anyone who runs `split` against it. The write is constrained rather than a free file-write primitive: component data is emitted only as YAML/JSON, and code-sample files are named after the HTTP method, so an attacker can place or overwrite files at an unintended path but has limited control over their name and contents.

### Patches

Fixed in `@redocly/cli` v2.33.2.

### Workarounds

Do not run the `split` command on API descriptions from untrusted or unreviewed sources.

To detect an exploit attempt, inspect the description's component names and `x-codeSamples` `lang` values for a literal `../` — neither legitimately contains path segments.

Affected: redocly-cli

Redocly CLI makes OpenAPI validation, linting, and documentation workflows easier. Prior to @redocly/cli 2.33.2, the split command constructs output paths under --outDir from untrusted OpenAPI or AsyncAPI component names and x-codeSamples lang values without verifying that the resolved target remains inside the selected directory. A description containing literal ../ traversal segments in those fields can cause the split command to place or overwrite files outside --outDir. Component data remains constrained to YAML or JSON, and code-sample filenames remain based on the HTTP method, so this is not an unrestricted arbitrary-content file write. This issue is fixed in @redocly/cli version 2.33.2.