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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-02T17:19:17.493738+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-92537</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-92537 — Newsletter &lt;= 9.3.9 - Unauthenticated Insufficiently Protected Credentials via '/tnp/l/' Click-Tracking REST Endpoint (…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T17:19:17.514517+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> satollo Newsletter – Send awesome emails from WordPress</p>
<p>The Newsletter – Send awesome emails from WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insufficiently Protected Credentials in all versions up to, and including, 9.3.9 The plugin's public click-tracking REST route `/tnp/l/` is registered with `permission_callback =&gt; '__return_true'` and, upon receiving a valid keyed-MD5 signature, calls `set_user_cookie()`, which emits a `Set-Cookie: newsletter=&lt;id&gt;-&lt;raw_token&gt;` response header to the requester because the subscriber object loaded via `get_user()` lacks the `_trusted` property, causing `get_user_key()` to return the raw token column value instead of its MD5-masked variant. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who obtain any signed click-tracking URL for a target subscriber to receive that subscriber's permanent raw authentication cookie, which they can then use to export the subscriber's full PII record via the JSON profile-export endpoint (`?na=px`), rewrite the subscriber's stored profile (`?na=ps`), and silently unsubscribe the subscriber via the RFC-8058 one-click endpoint (`?na=ocu`), none of which require a nonce, password, or email challenge. Signed tracking URLs are embedded in every external link of every newsletter delivered to a subscriber, carry no timestamp, and never expire until the site's relink key rotates, meaning that any party who observes such a URL — through a forwarded email, a shared inbox, a mail-gateway log, or Referer headers on the redirect target, which has no Referrer-Policy s…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-92537"/>
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