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  <updated>2026-10-01T20:15:54.976779+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-73626</id>
    <title>BREW-jupyterlab-CVE-2026-73626 — JupyterLab: Allowlist/blocklist check in `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` not enforced for direct callers (missing `awa…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T20:15:55.965425+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: jupyterlab</p>
<p>The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: `install()` was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API).  The only runtime symptom was a `RuntimeWarning: coroutine 'is_install_allowed' was never awaited.`</p>
<p>This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:
- a custom extension or downstream integration that imports `PyPIExtensionManager` and calls `install()` directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling `install()`);
- an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install;
- the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and
- kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension's `install()` call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>Low. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream i…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-73626"/>
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