https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-09-29T20:14:41.382173+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55074 CVE-2026-55074 — Ansible FreeBSD Jail Connection Plugin: Jail escape via symlink following in put_file (host-side root mv) 2026-09-29T20:14:41.384104+00:00

Affected: chofstede ansible_jailexec

Ansible FreeBSD Jail Connection Plugin is an Ansible connection plugin for FreeBSD Jails via jexec. Through version 1.3.0, the jailexec connection plugin's put_file resolved a transfer's destination to a path on the jail host ( + ) and ran mkdir -p and mv there as root on the host. Those commands follow symbolic links, and the path was operated on outside the jail, so a symlink existing inside the jail was followed by the host-side, root-privileged mv. A party controlling content inside a managed jail (the jail's root, or any process able to create a symlink in a directory an Ansible task later writes to) can therefore cause an arbitrary root-owned write on the host, outside the jail — a full jail escape. Arbitrary root-owned host writes are readily escalated to host compromise (e.g. cron, rc.d, authorized_keys). Preconditions for this vulnerability are that the operator runs a copy/template/fetch-style task (anything using put_file) against the jail, and the attacker can place a symlink inside the jail at or above the task's destination before the transfer runs. This issue has been fixed in version 2.0.0.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-cxgv-hp74-jj7r GHSA-cxgv-hp74-jj7r — Ansible FreeBSD Jail Connection Plugin: Jail escape via symlink following in put_file (host-side root mv) 2026-09-29T20:14:41.384233+00:00

Affected: PyPI: ansible-jailexec

Through version 1.3.0, the jailexec connection plugin's put_file resolved a transfer's destination to a path on the jail host (<jail filesystem root> + <destination>) and ran mkdir -p and mv there as root on the host. Those commands follow symbolic links, and the path was operated on outside the jail, so a symlink existing inside the jail was followed by the host-side, root-privileged mv.

A party controlling content inside a managed jail (the jail's root, or any process able to create a symlink in a directory an Ansible task later writes to) can therefore cause an arbitrary root-owned write on the host, outside the jail — a full jail escape. Arbitrary root-owned host writes are readily escalated to host compromise (e.g. cron, rc.d, authorized_keys).

Preconditions: the operator runs a copy/template/fetch-style task (anything using put_file) against the jail, and the attacker can place a symlink inside the jail at or above the task's destination before the transfer runs.

Patches: Fixed in 2.0.0. File transfers now run inside the jail via jexec (mkdir -p <dir> && cat > <dest> for put_file; cat < <src> for fetch_file), so every path resolves within the jail's chroot. An in-jail symlink can at most redirect within the same jail and can no longer reach the host.

Workarounds: None in affected versions; upgrade to 2.0.0.