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  <updated>2026-09-28T17:18:59.098296+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45018</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-45018 — Chainlit: Command injection via MCP stdio transport allows unauthenticated remote code execution</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T17:18:59.360452+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> chainlit</p>
<p>Chainlit is a Python framework for building production-ready conversational AI applications. From 2.4.0rc0 until 2.12.0, Chainlit deployments with features.mcp.enabled set to true in .chainlit/config.toml expose the POST /mcp endpoint without requiring authentication. For stdio transport, the endpoint accepts a user-controlled fullCommand string. The validate_mcp_command() function in backend/chainlit/mcp.py checks only the executable name against config.features.mcp.stdio.allowed_executables and passes unchecked arguments to StdioServerParameters in backend/chainlit/server.py. Because npx supports the -c argument, an attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Chainlit process. If allowed_executables is unset, its None default is treated as allowing every executable. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45018"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w3fx-mc44-mf6j</id>
    <title>GHSA-w3fx-mc44-mf6j — Chainlit has command injection via MCP stdio transport that allows unauthenticated remote code execution</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T17:18:59.360595+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: chainlit</p>
<p>### Am I affected?</p>
<p>Only if your deployment sets `features.mcp.enabled = true` in `.chainlit/config.toml`. **MCP has been disabled by default since v2.7.0**, so most Chainlit deployments are not affected. No authentication is required: `/mcp` is reachable by any client that can open a session.</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>When MCP is enabled (`features.mcp.enabled = true`), the `POST /mcp` endpoint for `stdio` transport accepts a user-controlled `fullCommand` string. The `validate_mcp_command()` function checks the executable name against a configurable allowlist but does not inspect or restrict the arguments. An attacker can pass `npx -y -c 'ARBITRARY COMMAND'` to execute arbitrary shell commands on the server with the privileges of the Chainlit process.</p>
<p>### Affected / patched versions</p>
<p>| | |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-45018 |
| Affected | `&gt;=2.4.0rc0, &lt;2.12.0` with `features.mcp.enabled = true` (introduced in PR #1977, the change that added MCP support) |
| Patched | **2.12.0** (releasing 2026-08-25) |</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>`validate_mcp_command()` in `backend/chainlit/mcp.py` uses `shlex.split()` to parse the command string and validates only the executable name (e.g., `npx`, `uvx`) against `config.features.mcp.stdio.allowed_executables`. Arguments are returned unchecked and passed directly to `StdioServerParameters`, which spawns a subprocess.</p>
<p>Since `npx` supports `-c` for arbitrary shell execution, `npx -y -c 'PAYLOAD'` passes the allowlist check while running whatever the attacker specifi…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w3fx-mc44-mf6j"/>
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