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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 08:12:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CERTFR-2026-AVI-0108 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de SUSE. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un at…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CERTFR-2026-AVI-0108</link>
      <description>CERTFR-2026-AVI-0108</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CERTFR-2026-AVI-0108</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2023-54276</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2023-54276</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2023-54276</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2023-54276</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-54276</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfsd: move init of percpu reply_cache_stats counters back to nfsd_init_net&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit f5f9d4a314da (&amp;#34;nfsd: move reply cache initialization into nfsd
startup&amp;#34;) moved the initialization of the reply cache into nfsd startup,
but didn&amp;#39;t account for the stats counters, which can be accessed before
nfsd is ever started. The result can be a NULL pointer dereference when
someone accesses /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats while nfsd is still
shut down.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a regression and a user-triggerable oops in the right situation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- non-x86_64 arch
- /proc/fs/nfsd is mounted in the namespace
- nfsd is not started in the namespace
- unprivileged user calls &amp;#34;cat /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although this is easy to trigger on some arches (like aarch64), on
x86_64, calling this_cpu_ptr(NULL) evidently returns a pointer to the
fixed_percpu_data. That struct looks just enough like a newly
initialized percpu var to allow nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show to access
it without Oopsing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move the initialization of the per-net+per-cpu reply-cache counters
back into nfsd_init_net, while leaving the rest of the reply cache
allocations to be done at nfsd startup time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kudos to Eirik who did most of the legwork to track this down.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfsd: move init of percpu reply_cache_stats counters back to nfsd_init_net&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit f5f9d4a314da (&amp;#34;nfsd: move reply cache initialization into nfsd
startup&amp;#34;) moved the initialization of the reply cache into nfsd startup,
but didn&amp;#39;t account for the stats counters, which can be accessed before
nfsd is ever started. The result can be a NULL pointer dereference when
someone accesses /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats while nfsd is still
shut down.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a regression and a user-triggerable oops in the right situation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- non-x86_64 arch
- /proc/fs/nfsd is mounted in the namespace
- nfsd is not started in the namespace
- unprivileged user calls &amp;#34;cat /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although this is easy to trigger on some arches (like aarch64), on
x86_64, calling this_cpu_ptr(NULL) evidently returns a pointer to the
fixed_percpu_data. That struct looks just enough like a newly
initialized percpu var to allow nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show to access
it without Oopsing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move the initialization of the per-net+per-cpu reply-cache counters
back into nfsd_init_net, while leaving the rest of the reply cache
allocations to be done at nfsd startup time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kudos to Eirik who did most of the legwork to track this down.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-54276</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4hqq-5h4g-jhph</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4hqq-5h4g-jhph</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfsd: move init of percpu reply_cache_stats counters back to nfsd_init_net&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit f5f9d4a314da (&amp;#34;nfsd: move reply cache initialization into nfsd
startup&amp;#34;) moved the initialization of the reply cache into nfsd startup,
but didn&amp;#39;t account for the stats counters, which can be accessed before
nfsd is ever started. The result can be a NULL pointer dereference when
someone accesses /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats while nfsd is still
shut down.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a regression and a user-triggerable oops in the right situation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- non-x86_64 arch
- /proc/fs/nfsd is mounted in the namespace
- nfsd is not started in the namespace
- unprivileged user calls &amp;#34;cat /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although this is easy to trigger on some arches (like aarch64), on
x86_64, calling this_cpu_ptr(NULL) evidently returns a pointer to the
fixed_percpu_data. That struct looks just enough like a newly
initialized percpu var to allow nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show to access
it without Oopsing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move the initialization of the per-net+per-cpu reply-cache counters
back into nfsd_init_net, while leaving the rest of the reply cache
allocations to be done at nfsd startup time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kudos to Eirik who did most of the legwork to track this down.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfsd: move init of percpu reply_cache_stats counters back to nfsd_init_net&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit f5f9d4a314da (&amp;#34;nfsd: move reply cache initialization into nfsd
startup&amp;#34;) moved the initialization of the reply cache into nfsd startup,
but didn&amp;#39;t account for the stats counters, which can be accessed before
nfsd is ever started. The result can be a NULL pointer dereference when
someone accesses /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats while nfsd is still
shut down.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a regression and a user-triggerable oops in the right situation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- non-x86_64 arch
- /proc/fs/nfsd is mounted in the namespace
- nfsd is not started in the namespace
- unprivileged user calls &amp;#34;cat /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although this is easy to trigger on some arches (like aarch64), on
x86_64, calling this_cpu_ptr(NULL) evidently returns a pointer to the
fixed_percpu_data. That struct looks just enough like a newly
initialized percpu var to allow nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show to access
it without Oopsing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move the initialization of the per-net+per-cpu reply-cache counters
back into nfsd_init_net, while leaving the rest of the reply cache
allocations to be done at nfsd startup time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kudos to Eirik who did most of the legwork to track this down.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4hqq-5h4g-jhph</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2023:6583 — security update for kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2023:6583</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;security update for kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;security update for kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2023:6583</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:0278-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:0278-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:0278-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2023-54276</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-54276</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 79 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: move init of percpu reply_cache_stats counters back to nfsd_init_net Commit f5f9d4a314da (&amp;#34;nfsd: move reply cache initialization into nfsd startup&amp;#34;) moved the initialization of the reply cache into nfsd startup, but didn&amp;#39;t account for the stats counters, which can be accessed before nfsd is ever started. The result can be a NULL pointer dereference when someone accesses /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats while nfsd is still shut down. This is a regression and a user-triggerable oops in the right situation: - non-x86_64 arch - /proc/fs/nfsd is mounted in the namespace - nfsd is not started in the namespace - unprivileged user calls &amp;#34;cat /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats&amp;#34; Although this is easy to trigger on some arches (like aarch64), on x86_64, calling this_cpu_ptr(NULL) evidently returns a pointer to the fixed_percpu_data. That struct looks just enough like a newly initialized percpu var to allow nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show to access it without Oopsing. Move the initialization of the per-net+per-cpu reply-cache counters back into nfsd_init_net, while leaving the rest of the reply cache allocations to be done at nfsd startup time. Kudos to Eirik who did most of the legwork to track this down.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 79 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: move init of percpu reply_cache_stats counters back to nfsd_init_net Commit f5f9d4a314da (&amp;#34;nfsd: move reply cache initialization into nfsd startup&amp;#34;) moved the initialization of the reply cache into nfsd startup, but didn&amp;#39;t account for the stats counters, which can be accessed before nfsd is ever started. The result can be a NULL pointer dereference when someone accesses /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats while nfsd is still shut down. This is a regression and a user-triggerable oops in the right situation: - non-x86_64 arch - /proc/fs/nfsd is mounted in the namespace - nfsd is not started in the namespace - unprivileged user calls &amp;#34;cat /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats&amp;#34; Although this is easy to trigger on some arches (like aarch64), on x86_64, calling this_cpu_ptr(NULL) evidently returns a pointer to the fixed_percpu_data. That struct looks just enough like a newly initialized percpu var to allow nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show to access it without Oopsing. Move the initialization of the per-net+per-cpu reply-cache counters back into nfsd_init_net, while leaving the rest of the reply cache allocations to be done at nfsd startup time. Kudos to Eirik who did most of the legwork to track this down.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-54276</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-2941 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Denial of Service</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2941</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann diese Schwachstellen ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, die möglicherweise zu Denial‑of‑Service, Speicherbeschädigung oder weiteren nicht definierten Auswirkungen führen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann diese Schwachstellen ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, die möglicherweise zu Denial‑of‑Service, Speicherbeschädigung oder weiteren nicht definierten Auswirkungen führen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2941</guid>
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