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fkie_cve-2026-101911

ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.7.1, the Address6 constructor, Address6.isValid, and parse code in src/ipv6.ts accept unbounded strings and expand invalid characters through RE_BAD_CHARACTERS into large diagnostics. Material impact occurs only when an application accepts a very large attacker-controlled field and passes it to Address6 parsing without an earlier length bound. Common URL and header limits, and common body-parser defaults, generally constrain the effect; common defaults typically exclude 32 MiB fields. Megabyte-scale fields can cause a synchronous stall and high transient memory use, approximately 16 MiB can trigger an invalid string length exception, and process termination occurs at approximately 32 MiB. The affected entry points include Address6.isValid and construction paths that reach parse. This issue is fixed in version 10.7.1.

GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw — ip-address: Address6 builds a parse diagnostic proportional to the input with no length bound, allowing a single long s…

Affected: npm: ip-address

### Summary

`new Address6()` and `Address6.isValid()` place no bound on the length of the string they parse. When the string contains a character that cannot appear in an IPv6 address, the parser builds a diagnostic that wraps every such character in a 34-byte `<span class="parse-error">`, so the work and the memory scale with the input rather than with an address. A 1 MiB string of `!` costs about 110 MB and 70 ms of synchronous work, 8 MiB costs about 800 MB and half a second, 16 MiB throws a `RangeError` in place of the documented `AddressError`, and 32 MiB aborts the Node process. `isValid()` builds the diagnostic and discards it, so a caller that only asks whether a string is valid pays the full price.

An application that validates an attacker-supplied string with these methods can be stalled or crashed by a single oversized request. This is a crash on input that should have been rejected cleanly, which SECURITY.md lists as in scope.

### Details

`parse()` in `src/ipv6.ts` checks for characters outside `[0-9a-f:/%]` and, on finding any, throws an `AddressError` whose `parseMessage` is the whole input with each offending character wrapped:

```ts const badCharacters = address.match(constants6.RE_BAD_CHARACTERS);

if (badCharacters) { throw new AddressError( `Bad character${badCharacters.length > 1 ? 's' : ''} detected in address: ${badCharacters.join('')}`, address.replace(constants6.RE_BAD_CHARACTERS, '<span class="parse-error">$1</span>'), ); } ```

`RE_…

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-101911

Affected: Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-ip-address, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-ip-address, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-ip-address, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-ip-address