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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-102509</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102509</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, Allocation of Resources Without Limits, and Uncontrolled Recursion in the Java implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) allow a malicious or impersonated device to exhaust the memory or stack of the client application, causing a denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the OPC UA driver these defects are reachable before authentication: the offending data is parsed while the secure channel and session are being established, before the server&amp;#39;s identity has been bound to it. Configuring a trusted server therefore does not prevent exploitation by an attacker who can 
impersonate it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The individual defects are:
- Length-prefixed byte strings are allocated at the size claimed on the wire before the length is checked against the data actually received (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- Array fields in generated protocol parsers pre-allocate a list with the element count claimed on the wire, allowing a single count field to trigger a multi-gigabyte allocation. This parser is shared by all PLC4J drivers; the OPC UA driver is the verified pre-authentication path (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- The OPC UA driver accumulates message chunks without enforcing the negotiated maximum chunk count and message size (0.12.0 through 0.13.1).
- The OPC UA driver pre-allocates collections using element counts received from the server (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- Recursive protocol types are parsed without a nesting-depth limit. The same defect in the Go implementation is covered by  C…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, Allocation of Resources Without Limits, and Uncontrolled Recursion in the Java implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) allow a malicious or impersonated device to exhaust the memory or stack of the client application, causing a denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the OPC UA driver these defects are reachable before authentication: the offending data is parsed while the secure channel and session are being established, before the server&amp;#39;s identity has been bound to it. Configuring a trusted server therefore does not prevent exploitation by an attacker who can 
impersonate it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The individual defects are:
- Length-prefixed byte strings are allocated at the size claimed on the wire before the length is checked against the data actually received (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- Array fields in generated protocol parsers pre-allocate a list with the element count claimed on the wire, allowing a single count field to trigger a multi-gigabyte allocation. This parser is shared by all PLC4J drivers; the OPC UA driver is the verified pre-authentication path (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- The OPC UA driver accumulates message chunks without enforcing the negotiated maximum chunk count and message size (0.12.0 through 0.13.1).
- The OPC UA driver pre-allocates collections using element counts received from the server (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- Recursive protocol types are parsed without a nesting-depth limit. The same defect in the Go implementation is covered by  C…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102509</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-c34c-r8hh-6grp</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c34c-r8hh-6grp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, Allocation of Resources Without Limits, and Uncontrolled Recursion in the Java implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) allow a malicious or impersonated device to exhaust the memory or stack of the client application, causing a denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the OPC UA driver these defects are reachable before authentication: the offending data is parsed while the secure channel and session are being established, before the server&amp;#39;s identity has been bound to it. Configuring a trusted server therefore does not prevent exploitation by an attacker who can 
impersonate it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The individual defects are:
- Length-prefixed byte strings are allocated at the size claimed on the wire before the length is checked against the data actually received (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- Array fields in generated protocol parsers pre-allocate a list with the element count claimed on the wire, allowing a single count field to trigger a multi-gigabyte allocation. This parser is shared by all PLC4J drivers; the OPC UA driver is the verified pre-authentication path (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- The OPC UA driver accumulates message chunks without enforcing the negotiated maximum chunk count and message size (0.12.0 through 0.13.1).
- The OPC UA driver pre-allocates collections using element counts received from the server (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- Recursive protocol types are parsed without a nesting-depth limit. The same defect in the Go implementation is covered by  C…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, Allocation of Resources Without Limits, and Uncontrolled Recursion in the Java implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) allow a malicious or impersonated device to exhaust the memory or stack of the client application, causing a denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the OPC UA driver these defects are reachable before authentication: the offending data is parsed while the secure channel and session are being established, before the server&amp;#39;s identity has been bound to it. Configuring a trusted server therefore does not prevent exploitation by an attacker who can 
impersonate it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The individual defects are:
- Length-prefixed byte strings are allocated at the size claimed on the wire before the length is checked against the data actually received (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- Array fields in generated protocol parsers pre-allocate a list with the element count claimed on the wire, allowing a single count field to trigger a multi-gigabyte allocation. This parser is shared by all PLC4J drivers; the OPC UA driver is the verified pre-authentication path (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- The OPC UA driver accumulates message chunks without enforcing the negotiated maximum chunk count and message size (0.12.0 through 0.13.1).
- The OPC UA driver pre-allocates collections using element counts received from the server (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- Recursive protocol types are parsed without a nesting-depth limit. The same defect in the Go implementation is covered by  C…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c34c-r8hh-6grp</guid>
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