https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 19:13:20 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-106103 <p>Quasar Framework is a framework for building high-performance Vue.js user interfaces. Prior to @quasar/icongenie 6.1.1, the icongenie generate --profile command accepted folder and name values from a user-supplied profile without constraining the resolved destination to the Quasar project directory. icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js joined those values with appDir, while icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js required only non-empty strings, allowing parent-directory traversal. A developer who runs a crafted profile can cause generated image content to be written or overwritten at any path writable by that user, potentially modifying shell startup files, build scripts, or other executable configuration. This issue is fixed in version 6.1.1.</p> <p>Quasar Framework is a framework for building high-performance Vue.js user interfaces. Prior to @quasar/icongenie 6.1.1, the icongenie generate --profile command accepted folder and name values from a user-supplied profile without constraining the resolved destination to the Quasar project directory. icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js joined those values with appDir, while icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js required only non-empty strings, allowing parent-directory traversal. A developer who runs a crafted profile can cause generated image content to be written or overwritten at any path writable by that user, potentially modifying shell startup files, build scripts, or other executable configuration. This issue is fixed in version 6.1.1.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-106103 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wmpw-j6qv-mw88 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @quasar/icongenie</p> <p>## Vulnerability Details</p> <p>**File**: `icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js` (line 35, `absoluteName: join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`) **Validation gap**: `icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js` (`assetsSchema`) — `folder`/`name` only checked with `Joi.string().required().min(1)`, no restriction on `..` sequences or absolute paths **Entry point**: `icongenie/lib/runner/generate.js` (`generate(argv)`) — `profile.assets = userProfile.assets`, loaded verbatim from a user-supplied JSON file via `--profile &lt;file&gt;`</p> <p>### Root Cause `icongenie generate --profile &lt;file&gt;` loads a JSON &#34;profile&#34; describing icon/splashscreen assets to generate, where each asset entry has a `folder`/`name` describing where the generated file should be written relative to the Quasar project directory (`appDir`). `getAssetsFiles()` builds the write target with `join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`. Node&#39;s `path.join` normalizes `..` segments arithmetically and does not clamp the result to stay inside `appDir`. The only validation before this (`validateProfileObject` → Joi `assetsSchema`) checks that `folder`/`name` are non-empty strings, with no `..` rejection and no containment check against `appDir`.</p> <p>A profile setting `folder: &#34;../../../../../../tmp/pwned-by-icongenie&#34;` sails through validation unmodified, and the generator writes attacker-influenced icon/splashscreen content to that path via a direct `writeFile`/`sharp().toFile()` call.</p> <p>### Attack Scenario 1. Attacker publishes a…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @quasar/icongenie</p> <p>## Vulnerability Details</p> <p>**File**: `icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js` (line 35, `absoluteName: join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`) **Validation gap**: `icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js` (`assetsSchema`) — `folder`/`name` only checked with `Joi.string().required().min(1)`, no restriction on `..` sequences or absolute paths **Entry point**: `icongenie/lib/runner/generate.js` (`generate(argv)`) — `profile.assets = userProfile.assets`, loaded verbatim from a user-supplied JSON file via `--profile &lt;file&gt;`</p> <p>### Root Cause `icongenie generate --profile &lt;file&gt;` loads a JSON &#34;profile&#34; describing icon/splashscreen assets to generate, where each asset entry has a `folder`/`name` describing where the generated file should be written relative to the Quasar project directory (`appDir`). `getAssetsFiles()` builds the write target with `join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`. Node&#39;s `path.join` normalizes `..` segments arithmetically and does not clamp the result to stay inside `appDir`. The only validation before this (`validateProfileObject` → Joi `assetsSchema`) checks that `folder`/`name` are non-empty strings, with no `..` rejection and no containment check against `appDir`.</p> <p>A profile setting `folder: &#34;../../../../../../tmp/pwned-by-icongenie&#34;` sails through validation unmodified, and the generator writes attacker-influenced icon/splashscreen content to that path via a direct `writeFile`/`sharp().toFile()` call.</p> <p>### Attack Scenario 1. Attacker publishes a…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wmpw-j6qv-mw88