https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 23:49:00 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-10651 <p>bt_sdp_parse_attribute() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c validated only that the SDP record buffer held the type-marker byte plus the 2-byte attribute ID (a check of buf-&gt;len &lt; 3) but then read a fourth byte, the data-element descriptor (type), via net_buf_simple_pull_u8(). Because net_buf_simple_pull_u8() dereferences buf-&gt;data[0] before its only bounds guard (an __ASSERT_NO_MSG that compiles out when CONFIG_ASSERT is disabled, the production default), a record of exactly three bytes (0x09 followed by a 2-byte attribute ID) causes a one-byte read past the end of the logical buffer. The parser is reachable from inbound, remote-controlled data: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer acting as an SDP server returns discovery-response records that are stored verbatim in the client receive buffer and parsed via the public bt_sdp_get_attr()/bt_sdp_has_attr()/bt_sdp_record_parse() helpers. The over-read is bounded to a single byte that is used only as an internal length selector and is never leaked to the attacker; subsequent length checks then reject the malformed record. Realistic impact is therefore limited to an edge-case denial of service (a fault only if the record ends exactly at a mapped-memory boundary, or a deterministic assert panic when CONFIG_ASSERT=y). Affects Zephyr v4.3.0 and v4.4.0; fixed by adding sizeof(type) to the length check.</p> <p>bt_sdp_parse_attribute() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c validated only that the SDP record buffer held the type-marker byte plus the 2-byte attribute ID (a check of buf-&gt;len &lt; 3) but then read a fourth byte, the data-element descriptor (type), via net_buf_simple_pull_u8(). Because net_buf_simple_pull_u8() dereferences buf-&gt;data[0] before its only bounds guard (an __ASSERT_NO_MSG that compiles out when CONFIG_ASSERT is disabled, the production default), a record of exactly three bytes (0x09 followed by a 2-byte attribute ID) causes a one-byte read past the end of the logical buffer. The parser is reachable from inbound, remote-controlled data: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer acting as an SDP server returns discovery-response records that are stored verbatim in the client receive buffer and parsed via the public bt_sdp_get_attr()/bt_sdp_has_attr()/bt_sdp_record_parse() helpers. The over-read is bounded to a single byte that is used only as an internal length selector and is never leaked to the attacker; subsequent length checks then reject the malformed record. Realistic impact is therefore limited to an edge-case denial of service (a fault only if the record ends exactly at a mapped-memory boundary, or a deterministic assert panic when CONFIG_ASSERT=y). Affects Zephyr v4.3.0 and v4.4.0; fixed by adding sizeof(type) to the length check.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-10651 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-10651 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: zephyr, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: zephyr, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: zephyr, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: zephyr, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: zephyr, Ubuntu:25.10: zephyr, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: zephyr</p> <p>bt_sdp_parse_attribute() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c validated only that the SDP record buffer held the type-marker byte plus the 2-byte attribute ID (a check of buf-&gt;len &lt; 3) but then read a fourth byte, the data-element descriptor (type), via net_buf_simple_pull_u8(). Because net_buf_simple_pull_u8() dereferences buf-&gt;data[0] before its only bounds guard (an __ASSERT_NO_MSG that compiles out when CONFIG_ASSERT is disabled, the production default), a record of exactly three bytes (0x09 followed by a 2-byte attribute ID) causes a one-byte read past the end of the logical buffer. The parser is reachable from inbound, remote-controlled data: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer acting as an SDP server returns discovery-response records that are stored verbatim in the client receive buffer and parsed via the public bt_sdp_get_attr()/bt_sdp_has_attr()/bt_sdp_record_parse() helpers. The over-read is bounded to a single byte that is used only as an internal length selector and is never leaked to the attacker; subsequent length checks then reject the malformed record. Realistic impact is therefore limited to an edge-case denial of service (a fault only if the record ends exactly at a mapped-memory boundary, or a deterministic assert panic when CONFIG_ASSERT=y). Affects Zephyr v4.3.0 and v4.4.0; fixed by adding sizeof(type) to the length check.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: zephyr, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: zephyr, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: zephyr, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: zephyr, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: zephyr, Ubuntu:25.10: zephyr, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: zephyr</p> <p>bt_sdp_parse_attribute() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c validated only that the SDP record buffer held the type-marker byte plus the 2-byte attribute ID (a check of buf-&gt;len &lt; 3) but then read a fourth byte, the data-element descriptor (type), via net_buf_simple_pull_u8(). Because net_buf_simple_pull_u8() dereferences buf-&gt;data[0] before its only bounds guard (an __ASSERT_NO_MSG that compiles out when CONFIG_ASSERT is disabled, the production default), a record of exactly three bytes (0x09 followed by a 2-byte attribute ID) causes a one-byte read past the end of the logical buffer. The parser is reachable from inbound, remote-controlled data: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer acting as an SDP server returns discovery-response records that are stored verbatim in the client receive buffer and parsed via the public bt_sdp_get_attr()/bt_sdp_has_attr()/bt_sdp_record_parse() helpers. The over-read is bounded to a single byte that is used only as an internal length selector and is never leaked to the attacker; subsequent length checks then reject the malformed record. Realistic impact is therefore limited to an edge-case denial of service (a fault only if the record ends exactly at a mapped-memory boundary, or a deterministic assert panic when CONFIG_ASSERT=y). Affects Zephyr v4.3.0 and v4.4.0; fixed by adding sizeof(type) to the length check.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-10651