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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 16:26:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-107808</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107808</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, POST /api/login checks EnabledOTP but does not require a WebAuthn assertion when EnabledPasskey is true and no TOTP secret is configured. A passkey-only account is therefore issued a session after password verification, despite Enabled2FA reporting that the account has a second factor. An attacker who obtains the password can take over the account and reach administrative functionality without the registered passkey. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, POST /api/login checks EnabledOTP but does not require a WebAuthn assertion when EnabledPasskey is true and no TOTP secret is configured. A passkey-only account is therefore issued a session after password verification, despite Enabled2FA reporting that the account has a second factor. An attacker who obtains the password can take over the account and reach administrative functionality without the registered passkey. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107808</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-45gv-9wjv-xh7p — Nginx UI: Authentication bypass: password login does not enforce a passkey-only second factor (2FA bypass)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-45gv-9wjv-xh7p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nginx-ui supports two second-factor methods — TOTP (OTP) and WebAuthn passkeys —
and reports an account as 2FA-enabled when **either** is configured. However, the
password login endpoint (`POST /api/login`) only enforces a second factor when a
**TOTP secret** is present. An account that has registered a **passkey but no
TOTP** is logged in after password verification alone — the passkey is never
requested. This silently downgrades a passkey-protected account to single-factor
(password-only) authentication.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The account&amp;#39;s 2FA policy treats passkeys as a valid factor (`model/user.go`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func (u *User) EnabledOTP() bool     { return len(u.OTPSecret) != 0 }
func (u *User) EnabledPasskey() bool { /* true if a passkey row exists */ }
func (u *User) Enabled2FA() bool     { return u.EnabledOTP() || u.EnabledPasskey() }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;func (u *User) AfterFind(_ *gorm.DB) error {
    u.EnabledTwoFA = u.Enabled2FA() // exposed to the UI as `enabled_2fa`
    return nil
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the login handler only checks `EnabledOTP()` (`api/user/auth.go`, `Login`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
u, err := user.Login(json.Name, json.Password)
...
if u.EnabledOTP() {                       // &amp;lt;-- only TOTP is enforced
    if json.OTP == &amp;#34;&amp;#34; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; json.RecoveryCode == &amp;#34;&amp;#34; {
        c.JSON(http.StatusOK, LoginResponse{Message: &amp;#34;The user has enabled 2FA&amp;#34;, Code: Enabled2FA}) // 199
        user.BanIP(clientIP)
        return
    }
    if _, err = user.VerifyOTP(u, json.OTP, json.RecoveryCode); err != nil { /* ... */…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nginx-ui supports two second-factor methods — TOTP (OTP) and WebAuthn passkeys —
and reports an account as 2FA-enabled when **either** is configured. However, the
password login endpoint (`POST /api/login`) only enforces a second factor when a
**TOTP secret** is present. An account that has registered a **passkey but no
TOTP** is logged in after password verification alone — the passkey is never
requested. This silently downgrades a passkey-protected account to single-factor
(password-only) authentication.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The account&amp;#39;s 2FA policy treats passkeys as a valid factor (`model/user.go`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func (u *User) EnabledOTP() bool     { return len(u.OTPSecret) != 0 }
func (u *User) EnabledPasskey() bool { /* true if a passkey row exists */ }
func (u *User) Enabled2FA() bool     { return u.EnabledOTP() || u.EnabledPasskey() }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;func (u *User) AfterFind(_ *gorm.DB) error {
    u.EnabledTwoFA = u.Enabled2FA() // exposed to the UI as `enabled_2fa`
    return nil
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the login handler only checks `EnabledOTP()` (`api/user/auth.go`, `Login`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
u, err := user.Login(json.Name, json.Password)
...
if u.EnabledOTP() {                       // &amp;lt;-- only TOTP is enforced
    if json.OTP == &amp;#34;&amp;#34; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; json.RecoveryCode == &amp;#34;&amp;#34; {
        c.JSON(http.StatusOK, LoginResponse{Message: &amp;#34;The user has enabled 2FA&amp;#34;, Code: Enabled2FA}) // 199
        user.BanIP(clientIP)
        return
    }
    if _, err = user.VerifyOTP(u, json.OTP, json.RecoveryCode); err != nil { /* ... */…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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