https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 14 Nov 2026 12:58:59 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mwcq-x4pv-999x <p>The SureDash – Community, Courses &amp; Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.0 This is due to the `save_settings()` REST handler at `/suredash/v1/save-settings` being gated only by `admin_permission_callback()`, which authorizes any holder of the custom `manage_portal_dashboard` capability (Portal Manager role) without requiring `promote_users`, `edit_users`, or `manage_options`, combined with `sanitize_settings_data()` iterating all attacker-supplied keys with no allow-list, allowing arbitrary keys such as `default_role` to pass through `sanitize_text_field()` unchanged and be persisted into the `portal_settings` option via `update_option()` with no role-validity check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Portal Manager-level access and above to poison the `default_role` setting to `administrator`, after which any subsequent new-user registration through the publicly accessible block-register endpoint reads the corrupted setting and passes it directly to `wp_insert_user()`, producing a full WordPress Administrator account under the attacker&#39;s control. The exploit requires two steps: a POST to the authenticated `save-settings` endpoint to overwrite `default_role`, followed by triggering a new registration through the unauthenticated block-register endpoint to receive the escalated account. Successful exploitation causes the attacker&#39;s own account to receive the complete administ…</p> <p>The SureDash – Community, Courses &amp; Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.0 This is due to the `save_settings()` REST handler at `/suredash/v1/save-settings` being gated only by `admin_permission_callback()`, which authorizes any holder of the custom `manage_portal_dashboard` capability (Portal Manager role) without requiring `promote_users`, `edit_users`, or `manage_options`, combined with `sanitize_settings_data()` iterating all attacker-supplied keys with no allow-list, allowing arbitrary keys such as `default_role` to pass through `sanitize_text_field()` unchanged and be persisted into the `portal_settings` option via `update_option()` with no role-validity check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Portal Manager-level access and above to poison the `default_role` setting to `administrator`, after which any subsequent new-user registration through the publicly accessible block-register endpoint reads the corrupted setting and passes it directly to `wp_insert_user()`, producing a full WordPress Administrator account under the attacker&#39;s control. The exploit requires two steps: a POST to the authenticated `save-settings` endpoint to overwrite `default_role`, followed by triggering a new registration through the unauthenticated block-register endpoint to receive the escalated account. Successful exploitation causes the attacker&#39;s own account to receive the complete administ…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mwcq-x4pv-999x