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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-19938</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19938</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Bluetooth host&amp;#39;s ATT transmit path releases a buffer it does not own when signing fails. chan_send() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c documents (and every other error exit implements) the contract that on failure the caller retains ownership of the net_buf; the BT_ATT_OP_SIGNED_WRITE_CMD branch instead called net_buf_unref(buf) when bt_smp_sign() returned an error and then returned that error to the caller. The callers act on the contract: process_queue() re-queues the buffer with k_queue_prepend(), bt_att_chan_send_rsp() puts it back on chan-&amp;gt;tx_queue, bt_att_chan_req_send() restores it into the request, and att_req_retry() unreferences it — so the already-freed buffer was re-queued, later dereferenced, and eventually freed again.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An ATT Signed Write Command is produced when an application calls bt_gatt_write_without_response_cb() with sign set on an unencrypted connection. bt_smp_sign() fails whenever no local CSRK exists for the peer (-ENOENT), and whether one exists is negotiated with the peer: smp_distribute_keys() stores a local CSRK only when the peer&amp;#39;s pairing key-distribution field requests the signing key and bonding was agreed. A peer can therefore pair without accepting the CSRK, pair with No Bonding, remain unpaired, or keep the link unencrypted, and the victim&amp;#39;s next signed write takes the failing path. Because struct net_buf&amp;#39;s node field is simultaneously the linkage word for the ATT TX FIFO, for the deferred-destroy list used by the att_pool destroy callba…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Bluetooth host&amp;#39;s ATT transmit path releases a buffer it does not own when signing fails. chan_send() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c documents (and every other error exit implements) the contract that on failure the caller retains ownership of the net_buf; the BT_ATT_OP_SIGNED_WRITE_CMD branch instead called net_buf_unref(buf) when bt_smp_sign() returned an error and then returned that error to the caller. The callers act on the contract: process_queue() re-queues the buffer with k_queue_prepend(), bt_att_chan_send_rsp() puts it back on chan-&amp;gt;tx_queue, bt_att_chan_req_send() restores it into the request, and att_req_retry() unreferences it — so the already-freed buffer was re-queued, later dereferenced, and eventually freed again.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An ATT Signed Write Command is produced when an application calls bt_gatt_write_without_response_cb() with sign set on an unencrypted connection. bt_smp_sign() fails whenever no local CSRK exists for the peer (-ENOENT), and whether one exists is negotiated with the peer: smp_distribute_keys() stores a local CSRK only when the peer&amp;#39;s pairing key-distribution field requests the signing key and bonding was agreed. A peer can therefore pair without accepting the CSRK, pair with No Bonding, remain unpaired, or keep the link unencrypted, and the victim&amp;#39;s next signed write takes the failing path. Because struct net_buf&amp;#39;s node field is simultaneously the linkage word for the ATT TX FIFO, for the deferred-destroy list used by the att_pool destroy callba…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19938</guid>
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