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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-46370</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46370</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions up to and including 4.84.1, the labels host-listing endpoint (GET /api/v1/fleet/labels/{id}/hosts) allowed an authenticated user with the lowest-privilege Observer role to extract host enrollment secrets through a sort-order oracle. The endpoint accepted a user-supplied order_key parameter that was not validated against a column allowlist, so an attacker with Global or Team Observer access could set the sort column to a sensitive field such as h.node_key and combine it with the cursor-based after parameter to binary-search the value one character at a time; the targeted value never appeared in the response, but the presence or absence of results revealed each character. Because node_key and orbit_node_key are the long-lived shared secrets that osquery and Orbit agents use to authenticate to the Fleet server, an attacker who reconstructed them could impersonate enrolled hosts, submit fabricated query results and inventory, retrieve pending scripts and MDM commands, and poison compliance and policy results across the deployment. This issue is fixed in version 4.84.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions up to and including 4.84.1, the labels host-listing endpoint (GET /api/v1/fleet/labels/{id}/hosts) allowed an authenticated user with the lowest-privilege Observer role to extract host enrollment secrets through a sort-order oracle. The endpoint accepted a user-supplied order_key parameter that was not validated against a column allowlist, so an attacker with Global or Team Observer access could set the sort column to a sensitive field such as h.node_key and combine it with the cursor-based after parameter to binary-search the value one character at a time; the targeted value never appeared in the response, but the presence or absence of results revealed each character. Because node_key and orbit_node_key are the long-lived shared secrets that osquery and Orbit agents use to authenticate to the Fleet server, an attacker who reconstructed them could impersonate enrolled hosts, submit fabricated query results and inventory, retrieve pending scripts and MDM commands, and poison compliance and policy results across the deployment. This issue is fixed in version 4.84.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46370</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vxm7-9x8v-8gm4 — Fleet has observer-level enrollment secret extraction via ORDER BY oracle on labels host-listing endpoint</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vxm7-9x8v-8gm4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability in Fleet&amp;#39;s labels host-listing endpoint allowed authenticated users with the lowest-privilege Observer role to extract host enrollment secrets (`node_key`, `orbit_node_key`) through a cursor-based binary search oracle. The endpoint accepted a user-supplied `order_key` parameter that was not validated against a column allowlist, permitting sort order to be driven by sensitive columns in a joined table.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `GET /api/v1/fleet/labels/{id}/hosts` endpoint constructs its query using a deprecated helper that did not restrict which columns could appear in the `ORDER BY` clause. An attacker with Global Observer or Team Observer credentials could supply a sensitive column name (for example, `h.node_key`) as `order_key` and combine it with the cursor-based `after` parameter to binary-search the values of those columns one character at a time. The targeted values never appeared in the response body, but the presence or absence of results revealed each character.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `node_key` and `orbit_node_key` values are the long-lived shared secrets used by osquery and Orbit agents to authenticate to the Fleet server. An attacker who extracted these keys could:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Impersonate enrolled hosts to Fleet&amp;#39;s osquery and Orbit endpoints
- Submit fabricated query results and host inventory data
- Retrieve pending scripts and MDM commands queued for the host
- Poison compliance and policy results across the Fleet deployment&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation required authenticated Obse…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability in Fleet&amp;#39;s labels host-listing endpoint allowed authenticated users with the lowest-privilege Observer role to extract host enrollment secrets (`node_key`, `orbit_node_key`) through a cursor-based binary search oracle. The endpoint accepted a user-supplied `order_key` parameter that was not validated against a column allowlist, permitting sort order to be driven by sensitive columns in a joined table.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `GET /api/v1/fleet/labels/{id}/hosts` endpoint constructs its query using a deprecated helper that did not restrict which columns could appear in the `ORDER BY` clause. An attacker with Global Observer or Team Observer credentials could supply a sensitive column name (for example, `h.node_key`) as `order_key` and combine it with the cursor-based `after` parameter to binary-search the values of those columns one character at a time. The targeted values never appeared in the response body, but the presence or absence of results revealed each character.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `node_key` and `orbit_node_key` values are the long-lived shared secrets used by osquery and Orbit agents to authenticate to the Fleet server. An attacker who extracted these keys could:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Impersonate enrolled hosts to Fleet&amp;#39;s osquery and Orbit endpoints
- Submit fabricated query results and host inventory data
- Retrieve pending scripts and MDM commands queued for the host
- Poison compliance and policy results across the Fleet deployment&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation required authenticated Obse…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vxm7-9x8v-8gm4</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1896 — Fleet: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Offenlegung von Informationen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1896</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Fleet ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Fleet ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1896</guid>
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