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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-46711</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46711</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Soft Machine is a Virtual Machine–based agentic development environment / Cloud OS. In versions 0.2.247 and prior, the workspace HTTP service that listens on 0.0.0.0:8080 inside each sm-ws-* Fly Machine exposes endpoints (/health, /file/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;, /archive/&amp;lt;dir&amp;gt;) without any authentication or origin check. Any host that can reach TCP/8080 on a workspace can read arbitrary files under that workspace&amp;#39;s /workspace root and download whole project trees as tar archives. Because every workspace shares the same Fly private 6PN and resolves all peer addresses via the unauthenticated _instances.internal TXT record, every other sm-ws-* machine on the same Fly app/org is a reachable, unauthenticated attacker — the trust boundary (workspace owner ↔ everyone-else) is missing. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Soft Machine is a Virtual Machine–based agentic development environment / Cloud OS. In versions 0.2.247 and prior, the workspace HTTP service that listens on 0.0.0.0:8080 inside each sm-ws-* Fly Machine exposes endpoints (/health, /file/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;, /archive/&amp;lt;dir&amp;gt;) without any authentication or origin check. Any host that can reach TCP/8080 on a workspace can read arbitrary files under that workspace&amp;#39;s /workspace root and download whole project trees as tar archives. Because every workspace shares the same Fly private 6PN and resolves all peer addresses via the unauthenticated _instances.internal TXT record, every other sm-ws-* machine on the same Fly app/org is a reachable, unauthenticated attacker — the trust boundary (workspace owner ↔ everyone-else) is missing. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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