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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55096</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55096</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;fast-mcp-telegram is a Telegram MCP Server. Prior to version 30.1, the send_message/send_message_to_phone MCP tools accept files as a list of http(s) URLs, which the server downloads and attaches to the outgoing Telegram message. Downloads are guarded by _validate_url_security, an SSRF denylist that checks the URL&amp;#39;s literal hostname string but never resolves DNS. The fetch (httpx.AsyncClient.get) does its own resolution at request time. Consequently a hostname that resolves to a loopback / private / link-local address passes the guard and is fetched — even with the secure defaults block_private_ips=True and allow_http_urls=False. Because the fetched body is returned to the attacker as a Telegram file attachment, this is a full-read, exfiltrating SSRF, not blind. This issue has been patched in version 30.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;fast-mcp-telegram is a Telegram MCP Server. Prior to version 30.1, the send_message/send_message_to_phone MCP tools accept files as a list of http(s) URLs, which the server downloads and attaches to the outgoing Telegram message. Downloads are guarded by _validate_url_security, an SSRF denylist that checks the URL&amp;#39;s literal hostname string but never resolves DNS. The fetch (httpx.AsyncClient.get) does its own resolution at request time. Consequently a hostname that resolves to a loopback / private / link-local address passes the guard and is fetched — even with the secure defaults block_private_ips=True and allow_http_urls=False. Because the fetched body is returned to the attacker as a Telegram file attachment, this is a full-read, exfiltrating SSRF, not blind. This issue has been patched in version 30.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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