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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55583</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55583</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Twenty is an open-source CRM (customer relationship management) platform. Prior to 2.9.0, Twenty was vulnerable to a cross-workspace insecure direct object reference (IDOR) in the AI agent monitor&amp;#39;s AgentTurnResolver, in packages/twenty-server/src/engine/metadata-modules/ai/ai-agent-monitor/reso lvers/agent-turn.resolver.ts. The agentTurns(agentId) query and the evaluateAgentTurn(turnId) mutation looked up rows by agentId or id only; although AgentTurnEntity has a workspaceId column, it was not included in the WHERE clause, and the class-level guards only checked that the caller was authenticated in some workspace rather than that the requested object belonged to it, with the same flaw present in agent-turn-grader.service.ts.  As a result, any authenticated user with the AI settings flag, a workspace owner by default, could target any other workspace on the same instance given the victim&amp;#39;s agentId or turnId: agentTurns returned the victim&amp;#39;s full  chat history including message parts such as raw chat text, tool calls, and tool outputs, while evaluateAgentTurn inserted an agentTurnEvaluation row with the victim&amp;#39;s workspaceId and fed the victim&amp;#39;s turn into the default LLM. The agentId and turnId are non-guessable UUIDs but are exposed  in the URL of the settings page. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Twenty is an open-source CRM (customer relationship management) platform. Prior to 2.9.0, Twenty was vulnerable to a cross-workspace insecure direct object reference (IDOR) in the AI agent monitor&amp;#39;s AgentTurnResolver, in packages/twenty-server/src/engine/metadata-modules/ai/ai-agent-monitor/reso lvers/agent-turn.resolver.ts. The agentTurns(agentId) query and the evaluateAgentTurn(turnId) mutation looked up rows by agentId or id only; although AgentTurnEntity has a workspaceId column, it was not included in the WHERE clause, and the class-level guards only checked that the caller was authenticated in some workspace rather than that the requested object belonged to it, with the same flaw present in agent-turn-grader.service.ts.  As a result, any authenticated user with the AI settings flag, a workspace owner by default, could target any other workspace on the same instance given the victim&amp;#39;s agentId or turnId: agentTurns returned the victim&amp;#39;s full  chat history including message parts such as raw chat text, tool calls, and tool outputs, while evaluateAgentTurn inserted an agentTurnEvaluation row with the victim&amp;#39;s workspaceId and fed the victim&amp;#39;s turn into the default LLM. The agentId and turnId are non-guessable UUIDs but are exposed  in the URL of the settings page. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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