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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-56681</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-56681</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;9Router is an AI router &amp;amp; token saver. Prior to 0.5.6, 9Router deployments that allow requests to reach Next.js without the sanitizing custom-server.js wrapper trust the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header in src/dashboardGuard.js when isLocalRequest decides whether canAccessPublicLlmApi may skip API-key validation for /api/v1/* routes. A remote unauthenticated attacker can set X-9r-Real-Ip to 127.0.0.1 and be classified as a local client, including on the verified GET /api/v1/models route. This permits unauthorized use of the instance owner&amp;#39;s configured LLM providers, consumption of paid credits, and enumeration of configured providers and models. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;9Router is an AI router &amp;amp; token saver. Prior to 0.5.6, 9Router deployments that allow requests to reach Next.js without the sanitizing custom-server.js wrapper trust the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header in src/dashboardGuard.js when isLocalRequest decides whether canAccessPublicLlmApi may skip API-key validation for /api/v1/* routes. A remote unauthenticated attacker can set X-9r-Real-Ip to 127.0.0.1 and be classified as a local client, including on the verified GET /api/v1/models route. This permits unauthorized use of the instance owner&amp;#39;s configured LLM providers, consumption of paid credits, and enumeration of configured providers and models. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-56681</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5mj8-gf6m-fhw8 — 9Router has an Authentication Bypass in Public LLM API via Spoofable X-9r-Real-Ip Header</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5mj8-gf6m-fhw8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: 9router&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;9router determines whether an incoming request originates from localhost by trusting the X-9r-Real-Ip HTTP request header. This header is intended to be produced and sanitized exclusively by the bundled custom-server.js layer from the TCP socket address. In deployment modes where requests reach Next.js directly (the header is never stripped/regenerated), a remote, unauthenticated attacker can simply send X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1 and be treated as a local client. This bypasses the API-key requirement on the public LLM API (/api/v1/*), granting unauthenticated access to the instance owner&amp;#39;s configured provider resources.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- src/dashboardGuard.js  
- isLocalRequest() — trusts the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header to decide loopback origin  
- canAccessPublicLlmApi() — grants access to /api/v1/* when isLocalRequest() returns true, skipping API-key validation  
- Verified affected route: GET /api/v1/models  
- Product version tested: 9router-app 0.5.4 (Next.js 16.2.9)
## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The authorization layer makes a security decision based on a client-controllable HTTP header. isLocalRequest() reads X-9r-Real-Ip and, if its value is a loopback address (127.0.0.1), classifies the request as local. The design assumes this header can only be set by the trusted custom-server.js wrapper (which derives it from the unspoofable socket address and strips any inbound copy). When the application is served without that wrapper, Next.js passes the attacker-su…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: 9router&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;9router determines whether an incoming request originates from localhost by trusting the X-9r-Real-Ip HTTP request header. This header is intended to be produced and sanitized exclusively by the bundled custom-server.js layer from the TCP socket address. In deployment modes where requests reach Next.js directly (the header is never stripped/regenerated), a remote, unauthenticated attacker can simply send X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1 and be treated as a local client. This bypasses the API-key requirement on the public LLM API (/api/v1/*), granting unauthenticated access to the instance owner&amp;#39;s configured provider resources.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- src/dashboardGuard.js  
- isLocalRequest() — trusts the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header to decide loopback origin  
- canAccessPublicLlmApi() — grants access to /api/v1/* when isLocalRequest() returns true, skipping API-key validation  
- Verified affected route: GET /api/v1/models  
- Product version tested: 9router-app 0.5.4 (Next.js 16.2.9)
## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The authorization layer makes a security decision based on a client-controllable HTTP header. isLocalRequest() reads X-9r-Real-Ip and, if its value is a loopback address (127.0.0.1), classifies the request as local. The design assumes this header can only be set by the trusted custom-server.js wrapper (which derives it from the unspoofable socket address and strips any inbound copy). When the application is served without that wrapper, Next.js passes the attacker-su…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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