https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 16:05:40 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57171 <p>Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a Python SDK and command-line tool for managing OSCAL compliance documents. In versions before 3.12.4 and versions 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the catalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate author commands write generated Markdown to an attacker-influenced output path without path-traversal validation, allowing arbitrary file write outside the Trestle workspace. These commands join the user-supplied output argument onto the Trestle root and write to the result, but guard it only with an is_directory_name_allowed() task-name-collision check rather than the PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard used by the jinja command, so an absolute path or one containing traversal sequences escapes the workspace and writes files under an attacker-chosen location as the invoking process owner. The security boundary is crossed when a trusted CI job, shared service, or wrapper derives the output argument from repository-controlled, tenant-controlled, or otherwise untrusted data while expecting output to stay inside the workspace. When --force-overwrite is used, the selected output directory is first recursively deleted, extending the primitive to destruction of an attacker-chosen directory tree and enabling indirect code execution by overwriting files a pipeline later runs. This issue is fixed in versions 3.12.4 and 4.1.0.</p> <p>Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a Python SDK and command-line tool for managing OSCAL compliance documents. In versions before 3.12.4 and versions 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the catalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate author commands write generated Markdown to an attacker-influenced output path without path-traversal validation, allowing arbitrary file write outside the Trestle workspace. These commands join the user-supplied output argument onto the Trestle root and write to the result, but guard it only with an is_directory_name_allowed() task-name-collision check rather than the PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard used by the jinja command, so an absolute path or one containing traversal sequences escapes the workspace and writes files under an attacker-chosen location as the invoking process owner. The security boundary is crossed when a trusted CI job, shared service, or wrapper derives the output argument from repository-controlled, tenant-controlled, or otherwise untrusted data while expecting output to stay inside the workspace. When --force-overwrite is used, the selected output directory is first recursively deleted, extending the primitive to destruction of an attacker-chosen directory tree and enabling indirect code execution by overwriting files a pipeline later runs. This issue is fixed in versions 3.12.4 and 4.1.0.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57171 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r4vp-3vw6-r2x5 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: compliance-trestle</p> <p>**At a glance**</p> <p>- **Actor:** attacker who controls the -o/--output argument to trestle author {catalog,profile,ssp}-generate (e.g. via a CI pipeline that derives the output directory from repository-controlled data)</p> <p>- **Primitive:** attacker-controlled --output value reaches trestle_root / args.output write sink with only is_directory_name_allowed() (parts[0]-only task-name-collision check), not the PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard added by the CVE-2026-46345 fix</p> <p>- **Impact:** arbitrary-location file write outside the trestle workspace as the process owner (8.4 High; conservative C:N variant 7.7, still High); with --force-overwrite, the attacker-chosen directory is first recursively deleted shutil.rmtree)</p> <p>- **Precondition:** attacker influences the -o argument in a CI/automation pipeline or multi-tenant trestle workspace running these generate subcommands</p> <p>- **Fix:** call PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path(markdown_path, trestle_root) immediately after building markdown_path in catalog.py, ssp.py, and prof.py, mirroring the existing jinja fix</p> <p>## Overview</p> <p>The remediation for **CVE-2026-46345 / GHSA-4q5v-7g7x-j79w** (&#34;Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in compliance-trestle – jinja&#34;) added a new PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard and wired it into the jinja command&#39;s output path. The identical output = trestle_root / args.output write pattern in the sibling author commands — catalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: compliance-trestle</p> <p>**At a glance**</p> <p>- **Actor:** attacker who controls the -o/--output argument to trestle author {catalog,profile,ssp}-generate (e.g. via a CI pipeline that derives the output directory from repository-controlled data)</p> <p>- **Primitive:** attacker-controlled --output value reaches trestle_root / args.output write sink with only is_directory_name_allowed() (parts[0]-only task-name-collision check), not the PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard added by the CVE-2026-46345 fix</p> <p>- **Impact:** arbitrary-location file write outside the trestle workspace as the process owner (8.4 High; conservative C:N variant 7.7, still High); with --force-overwrite, the attacker-chosen directory is first recursively deleted shutil.rmtree)</p> <p>- **Precondition:** attacker influences the -o argument in a CI/automation pipeline or multi-tenant trestle workspace running these generate subcommands</p> <p>- **Fix:** call PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path(markdown_path, trestle_root) immediately after building markdown_path in catalog.py, ssp.py, and prof.py, mirroring the existing jinja fix</p> <p>## Overview</p> <p>The remediation for **CVE-2026-46345 / GHSA-4q5v-7g7x-j79w** (&#34;Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in compliance-trestle – jinja&#34;) added a new PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard and wired it into the jinja command&#39;s output path. The identical output = trestle_root / args.output write pattern in the sibling author commands — catalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r4vp-3vw6-r2x5