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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63573</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63573</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Observable discrepancy in the CMS RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key-transport unwrap (KeyTransRecipientInformation.UnwrapKey) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote attacker who holds a captured CMS EnvelopedData message, and who can submit many modified messages to an application that decrypts them with the recipient&amp;#39;s RSA private key and reveals how decryption failed, to recover the captured message&amp;#39;s content-encryption key and so its content, via a Bleichenbacher-style adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack, because a key-transport ciphertext with invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is rejected during unwrap with a distinct &amp;#34;bad padding in message.&amp;#34; CmsException instead of being replaced by a random key, so it can be told apart from a correctly padded ciphertext, which fails only later at content decryption.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Observable discrepancy in the CMS RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key-transport unwrap (KeyTransRecipientInformation.UnwrapKey) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote attacker who holds a captured CMS EnvelopedData message, and who can submit many modified messages to an application that decrypts them with the recipient&amp;#39;s RSA private key and reveals how decryption failed, to recover the captured message&amp;#39;s content-encryption key and so its content, via a Bleichenbacher-style adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack, because a key-transport ciphertext with invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is rejected during unwrap with a distinct &amp;#34;bad padding in message.&amp;#34; CmsException instead of being replaced by a random key, so it can be told apart from a correctly padded ciphertext, which fails only later at content decryption.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-xx4m-xv2j-xx6g</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xx4m-xv2j-xx6g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Observable discrepancy in the CMS RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key-transport unwrap (KeyTransRecipientInformation.UnwrapKey) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote attacker who holds a captured CMS EnvelopedData message, and who can submit many modified messages to an application that decrypts them with the recipient&amp;#39;s RSA private key and reveals how decryption failed, to recover the captured message&amp;#39;s content-encryption key and so its content, via a Bleichenbacher-style adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack, because a key-transport ciphertext with invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is rejected during unwrap with a distinct &amp;#34;bad padding in message.&amp;#34; CmsException instead of being replaced by a random key, so it can be told apart from a correctly padded ciphertext, which fails only later at content decryption.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Observable discrepancy in the CMS RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key-transport unwrap (KeyTransRecipientInformation.UnwrapKey) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote attacker who holds a captured CMS EnvelopedData message, and who can submit many modified messages to an application that decrypts them with the recipient&amp;#39;s RSA private key and reveals how decryption failed, to recover the captured message&amp;#39;s content-encryption key and so its content, via a Bleichenbacher-style adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack, because a key-transport ciphertext with invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is rejected during unwrap with a distinct &amp;#34;bad padding in message.&amp;#34; CmsException instead of being replaced by a random key, so it can be told apart from a correctly padded ciphertext, which fails only later at content decryption.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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