Most recent entries from all

Withdrawn: CLEANSTART-2026-BG21634 — Security fixes in langfuse-worker 3.216.0-r1

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: langfuse-worker

Package langfuse-worker version 3.216.0-r1 fixes 29 vulnerabilities: ghsa-frvp-7c67-39w9, ghsa-p63j-vcc4-9vmv, ghsa-55q2-fjhq-7xh7, ghsa-c2j3-45gr-mqc4, CVE-2026-69192...

fkie_cve-2026-73419

NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.

GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279 — Auth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them

Affected: npm: @auth/core, npm: next-auth

## Summary

Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks (`state`, `nonce`, and the PKCE verifier) in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider, because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity (provider id, issuer, client id, or redirect URI). In a multi-provider app that allows account linking while logged in, this provider-confusion / mix-up condition can let an attacker link their account at a second provider to a victim's user.

## Am I affected?

You may be affected if **all** of the following hold:

- You use `next-auth` `<= 4.24.14` or `>= 5.0.0-beta.1, <= 5.0.0-beta.31`, or `@auth/core` `<= 0.41.2`. - You configure multiple OAuth/OIDC providers. - You allow users to link additional providers while logged in. - At least one configured provider's authorization request is observable by an attacker, and at least one target provider's callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier (i.e. it relies only on `state` or only on `nonce`).

You are **not** affected if you use a single OAuth provider, do not allow logged-in account linking, or all providers enforce PKCE.

## Impact

- Account-linking confusion: an attacker can get their account at a target provider linked to the victim's Auth.js user, granting the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account through that linked prov…