https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 30 Sep 2026 22:01:06 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-15036 bdu:2026-15036 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-15036 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-79676 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: acronym</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Several corpus readers still step outside NLTK&#39;s symlink-aware trusted-root model. They derive in-root paths from trusted corpus state, convert those paths back into plain strings, and reopen them with built-in `open()` rather than `nltk.pathsec.open()`.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Path traversal and symlink boundary bypass - **Affected component:** `nltk.corpus.reader.ipipan`, `nltk.corpus.reader.crubadan`, `nltk.corpus.reader.lin` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Root-derived paths are reopened with raw `open()` without preserving the trusted-root boundary.</p> <p>`IPIPANCorpusReader` opens `header.xml` derived from `morph.xml`, `CrubadanCorpusReader` opens `table.txt` directly, and `LinThesaurusCorpusReader` opens `simN.lsp` paths returned from its own root helpers. Under `pathsec.ENFORCE=True`, a symlink placed inside the trusted corpus root can point outside the root and still be parsed successfully. It was confirmed parsed outside-root content is returned through public methods such as `channels()`, `domains()`, `categories()`, `langs()`, `crubadan_to_iso()`, `synonyms()`, and `scored_synonyms()`.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application processes attacker-influenced corpora inside a trusted NLTK data root or trusted corpus directory.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Create a trusted corpus root and keep `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` with that root allowl…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: acronym</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Several corpus readers still step outside NLTK&#39;s symlink-aware trusted-root model. They derive in-root paths from trusted corpus state, convert those paths back into plain strings, and reopen them with built-in `open()` rather than `nltk.pathsec.open()`.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Path traversal and symlink boundary bypass - **Affected component:** `nltk.corpus.reader.ipipan`, `nltk.corpus.reader.crubadan`, `nltk.corpus.reader.lin` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Root-derived paths are reopened with raw `open()` without preserving the trusted-root boundary.</p> <p>`IPIPANCorpusReader` opens `header.xml` derived from `morph.xml`, `CrubadanCorpusReader` opens `table.txt` directly, and `LinThesaurusCorpusReader` opens `simN.lsp` paths returned from its own root helpers. Under `pathsec.ENFORCE=True`, a symlink placed inside the trusted corpus root can point outside the root and still be parsed successfully. It was confirmed parsed outside-root content is returned through public methods such as `channels()`, `domains()`, `categories()`, `langs()`, `crubadan_to_iso()`, `synonyms()`, and `scored_synonyms()`.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application processes attacker-influenced corpora inside a trusted NLTK data root or trusted corpus directory.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Create a trusted corpus root and keep `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` with that root allowl…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-79676 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-79676 <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.3 contain a path traversal vulnerability in corpus readers that reopen root-derived paths using built-in open() instead of nltk.pathsec.open(), allowing symlinks to escape trusted roots. Attackers who stage symlinked corpus files under a trusted data root can disclose outside-root content through normal corpus reader methods like channels(), domains(), and synonyms().</p> <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.3 contain a path traversal vulnerability in corpus readers that reopen root-derived paths using built-in open() instead of nltk.pathsec.open(), allowing symlinks to escape trusted roots. Attackers who stage symlinked corpus files under a trusted data root can disclose outside-root content through normal corpus reader methods like channels(), domains(), and synonyms().</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-79676 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-p4rw-rvv2-7xwr <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Several corpus readers still step outside NLTK&#39;s symlink-aware trusted-root model. They derive in-root paths from trusted corpus state, convert those paths back into plain strings, and reopen them with built-in `open()` rather than `nltk.pathsec.open()`.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Path traversal and symlink boundary bypass - **Affected component:** `nltk.corpus.reader.ipipan`, `nltk.corpus.reader.crubadan`, `nltk.corpus.reader.lin` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Root-derived paths are reopened with raw `open()` without preserving the trusted-root boundary.</p> <p>`IPIPANCorpusReader` opens `header.xml` derived from `morph.xml`, `CrubadanCorpusReader` opens `table.txt` directly, and `LinThesaurusCorpusReader` opens `simN.lsp` paths returned from its own root helpers. Under `pathsec.ENFORCE=True`, a symlink placed inside the trusted corpus root can point outside the root and still be parsed successfully. It was confirmed parsed outside-root content is returned through public methods such as `channels()`, `domains()`, `categories()`, `langs()`, `crubadan_to_iso()`, `synonyms()`, and `scored_synonyms()`.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application processes attacker-influenced corpora inside a trusted NLTK data root or trusted corpus directory.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Create a trusted corpus root and keep `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` with that root allowl…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Several corpus readers still step outside NLTK&#39;s symlink-aware trusted-root model. They derive in-root paths from trusted corpus state, convert those paths back into plain strings, and reopen them with built-in `open()` rather than `nltk.pathsec.open()`.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Path traversal and symlink boundary bypass - **Affected component:** `nltk.corpus.reader.ipipan`, `nltk.corpus.reader.crubadan`, `nltk.corpus.reader.lin` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Root-derived paths are reopened with raw `open()` without preserving the trusted-root boundary.</p> <p>`IPIPANCorpusReader` opens `header.xml` derived from `morph.xml`, `CrubadanCorpusReader` opens `table.txt` directly, and `LinThesaurusCorpusReader` opens `simN.lsp` paths returned from its own root helpers. Under `pathsec.ENFORCE=True`, a symlink placed inside the trusted corpus root can point outside the root and still be parsed successfully. It was confirmed parsed outside-root content is returned through public methods such as `channels()`, `domains()`, `categories()`, `langs()`, `crubadan_to_iso()`, `synonyms()`, and `scored_synonyms()`.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application processes attacker-influenced corpora inside a trusted NLTK data root or trusted corpus directory.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Create a trusted corpus root and keep `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` with that root allowl…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-p4rw-rvv2-7xwr https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3737 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.3 contain a path traversal vulnerability in corpus readers that reopen root-derived paths using built-in open() instead of nltk.pathsec.open(), allowing symlinks to escape trusted roots. Attackers who stage symlinked corpus files under a trusted data root can disclose outside-root content through normal corpus reader methods like channels(), domains(), and synonyms().</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.3 contain a path traversal vulnerability in corpus readers that reopen root-derived paths using built-in open() instead of nltk.pathsec.open(), allowing symlinks to escape trusted roots. Attackers who stage symlinked corpus files under a trusted data root can disclose outside-root content through normal corpus reader methods like channels(), domains(), and synonyms().</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3737 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-79676 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: nltk</p> <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.3 contain a path traversal vulnerability in corpus readers that reopen root-derived paths using built-in open() instead of nltk.pathsec.open(), allowing symlinks to escape trusted roots. Attackers who stage symlinked corpus files under a trusted data root can disclose outside-root content through normal corpus reader methods like channels(), domains(), and synonyms().</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: nltk</p> <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.3 contain a path traversal vulnerability in corpus readers that reopen root-derived paths using built-in open() instead of nltk.pathsec.open(), allowing symlinks to escape trusted roots. Attackers who stage symlinked corpus files under a trusted data root can disclose outside-root content through normal corpus reader methods like channels(), domains(), and synonyms().</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-79676