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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-81862</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81862</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Apache Airflow&amp;#39;s Teradata provider embedded cloud storage credentials directly into SQL statements. `S3ToTeradataOperator` and `AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator` interpolate the source bucket&amp;#39;s credentials as plain string literals into the `CREATE MULTISET TABLE ... LOCATION` statement whenever the bucket is private and no `teradata_authorization_name` is configured — which is the default credential path for both operators. The statement is then logged and executed, so the credentials reach two places outside the operator&amp;#39;s control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two operators expose different credentials through different channels, and deployments should check both. `S3ToTeradataOperator` takes its values from `s3_hook.get_credentials()`, which under an instance profile or IRSA returns runtime AWS credentials that were never registered with Airflow&amp;#39;s secrets masker — and the STS session token is runtime-generated and therefore unmasked even when an AWS connection is configured. Those credentials appear **in the Airflow task log**, readable by any user with log-view permission on the Dag. `AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator` takes its storage account key from the connection, so the masker usually redacts the task-log copy; its exposure is the Teradata side. **Both** operators write the credentials into Teradata&amp;#39;s DBQL query logs and live monitoring views, where Airflow&amp;#39;s masking never applies and the values persist for that system&amp;#39;s log retention period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affects deployments using either operator a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Apache Airflow&amp;#39;s Teradata provider embedded cloud storage credentials directly into SQL statements. `S3ToTeradataOperator` and `AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator` interpolate the source bucket&amp;#39;s credentials as plain string literals into the `CREATE MULTISET TABLE ... LOCATION` statement whenever the bucket is private and no `teradata_authorization_name` is configured — which is the default credential path for both operators. The statement is then logged and executed, so the credentials reach two places outside the operator&amp;#39;s control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two operators expose different credentials through different channels, and deployments should check both. `S3ToTeradataOperator` takes its values from `s3_hook.get_credentials()`, which under an instance profile or IRSA returns runtime AWS credentials that were never registered with Airflow&amp;#39;s secrets masker — and the STS session token is runtime-generated and therefore unmasked even when an AWS connection is configured. Those credentials appear **in the Airflow task log**, readable by any user with log-view permission on the Dag. `AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator` takes its storage account key from the connection, so the masker usually redacts the task-log copy; its exposure is the Teradata side. **Both** operators write the credentials into Teradata&amp;#39;s DBQL query logs and live monitoring views, where Airflow&amp;#39;s masking never applies and the values persist for that system&amp;#39;s log retention period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affects deployments using either operator a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81862</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jcpw-3g4p-9hmj</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jcpw-3g4p-9hmj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Apache Airflow&amp;#39;s Teradata provider embedded cloud storage credentials directly into SQL statements. `S3ToTeradataOperator` and `AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator` interpolate the source bucket&amp;#39;s credentials as plain string literals into the `CREATE MULTISET TABLE ... LOCATION` statement whenever the bucket is private and no `teradata_authorization_name` is configured — which is the default credential path for both operators. The statement is then logged and executed, so the credentials reach two places outside the operator&amp;#39;s control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two operators expose different credentials through different channels, and deployments should check both. `S3ToTeradataOperator` takes its values from `s3_hook.get_credentials()`, which under an instance profile or IRSA returns runtime AWS credentials that were never registered with Airflow&amp;#39;s secrets masker — and the STS session token is runtime-generated and therefore unmasked even when an AWS connection is configured. Those credentials appear **in the Airflow task log**, readable by any user with log-view permission on the Dag. `AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator` takes its storage account key from the connection, so the masker usually redacts the task-log copy; its exposure is the Teradata side. **Both** operators write the credentials into Teradata&amp;#39;s DBQL query logs and live monitoring views, where Airflow&amp;#39;s masking never applies and the values persist for that system&amp;#39;s log retention period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affects deployments using either operator a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Apache Airflow&amp;#39;s Teradata provider embedded cloud storage credentials directly into SQL statements. `S3ToTeradataOperator` and `AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator` interpolate the source bucket&amp;#39;s credentials as plain string literals into the `CREATE MULTISET TABLE ... LOCATION` statement whenever the bucket is private and no `teradata_authorization_name` is configured — which is the default credential path for both operators. The statement is then logged and executed, so the credentials reach two places outside the operator&amp;#39;s control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two operators expose different credentials through different channels, and deployments should check both. `S3ToTeradataOperator` takes its values from `s3_hook.get_credentials()`, which under an instance profile or IRSA returns runtime AWS credentials that were never registered with Airflow&amp;#39;s secrets masker — and the STS session token is runtime-generated and therefore unmasked even when an AWS connection is configured. Those credentials appear **in the Airflow task log**, readable by any user with log-view permission on the Dag. `AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator` takes its storage account key from the connection, so the masker usually redacts the task-log copy; its exposure is the Teradata side. **Both** operators write the credentials into Teradata&amp;#39;s DBQL query logs and live monitoring views, where Airflow&amp;#39;s masking never applies and the values persist for that system&amp;#39;s log retention period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affects deployments using either operator a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jcpw-3g4p-9hmj</guid>
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