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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-13684</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-13684</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-13684</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-13684</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-81889</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81889</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;elFinder is an open-source file manager for web, written in JavaScript using jQuery UI. Prior to 2.1.70, elFinder URL uploads in php/elFinder.class.php can bypass server-side request forgery protections when PHP cURL is unavailable because validate_address() validates $info[&amp;#39;ip&amp;#39;], but get_remote_contents() selects fsock_get_contents(), which connects to $arr[&amp;#39;host&amp;#39;] and performs a second DNS resolution. An attacker able to submit a URL upload can use DNS rebinding to have the first resolution return a public address and the connection resolution return a loopback or private address, causing the internal HTTP response body to be stored as an uploaded file and made readable through elFinder. After a successful fetch, get_headers($url, true) separately requests the original hostname without reusing the validated and pinned connection, creating an additional blind server-side request forgery path even when curl_get_contents() is selected. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.70.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;elFinder is an open-source file manager for web, written in JavaScript using jQuery UI. Prior to 2.1.70, elFinder URL uploads in php/elFinder.class.php can bypass server-side request forgery protections when PHP cURL is unavailable because validate_address() validates $info[&amp;#39;ip&amp;#39;], but get_remote_contents() selects fsock_get_contents(), which connects to $arr[&amp;#39;host&amp;#39;] and performs a second DNS resolution. An attacker able to submit a URL upload can use DNS rebinding to have the first resolution return a public address and the connection resolution return a loopback or private address, causing the internal HTTP response body to be stored as an uploaded file and made readable through elFinder. After a successful fetch, get_headers($url, true) separately requests the original hostname without reusing the validated and pinned connection, creating an additional blind server-side request forgery path even when curl_get_contents() is selected. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.70.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81889</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8x3q-jpjh-qh5c — elFinder: SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding in the `fsock_get_contents()` fallback</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8x3q-jpjh-qh5c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: studio-42/elfinder&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/30352020/poc.zip)
## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;elFinder 2.1.69 is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) protection bypass when PHP cURL is unavailable and URL uploads use the `fsock_get_contents()` fallback.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who can submit a URL for server-side upload can use an attacker-controlled DNS hostname that initially resolves to an allowed public IP address and subsequently resolves to a loopback or private IP address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URL validation checks the first resolved IP, but `fsock_get_contents()` opens the actual connection using the original hostname. This causes a second DNS resolution and allows the connection to reach an address different from the one that was validated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The response from the internal service is saved as an uploaded file and can be read through elFinder. This makes the demonstrated issue a non-blind SSRF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The most accurate classification is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* Vulnerability: SSRF protection bypass 
* Exploitation technique: DNS rebinding
* Root cause: TOCTOU/double DNS resolution without IP pinning&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confirmed affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* elFinder 2.1.69, commit `8f2c3ffafcdd52cf4515f1eec172f4eee44552ad`
* the current `master` branch inspected on 24 July 2026&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The earliest affected version has not been determined.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Preconditions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The demonstrated readback path requires:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* PHP without the cURL extension (`curl_exec()` unavailable);
* access to the URL upload functionality;
* permission to upload a MIME type re…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: studio-42/elfinder&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/30352020/poc.zip)
## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;elFinder 2.1.69 is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) protection bypass when PHP cURL is unavailable and URL uploads use the `fsock_get_contents()` fallback.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who can submit a URL for server-side upload can use an attacker-controlled DNS hostname that initially resolves to an allowed public IP address and subsequently resolves to a loopback or private IP address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URL validation checks the first resolved IP, but `fsock_get_contents()` opens the actual connection using the original hostname. This causes a second DNS resolution and allows the connection to reach an address different from the one that was validated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The response from the internal service is saved as an uploaded file and can be read through elFinder. This makes the demonstrated issue a non-blind SSRF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The most accurate classification is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* Vulnerability: SSRF protection bypass 
* Exploitation technique: DNS rebinding
* Root cause: TOCTOU/double DNS resolution without IP pinning&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confirmed affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* elFinder 2.1.69, commit `8f2c3ffafcdd52cf4515f1eec172f4eee44552ad`
* the current `master` branch inspected on 24 July 2026&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The earliest affected version has not been determined.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Preconditions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The demonstrated readback path requires:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* PHP without the cURL extension (`curl_exec()` unavailable);
* access to the URL upload functionality;
* permission to upload a MIME type re…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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