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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-84319</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84319</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to 2.4.1, the regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as load_module, js_import, and js_content. However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. This allows the user to load ngx_http_js_module.so, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to 2.4.1, the regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as load_module, js_import, and js_content. However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. This allows the user to load ngx_http_js_module.so, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84319</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5r62-gj48-897x — Nginx UI: MCP configuration tools bypass restricted directive validation and allow secondary authenticated users to exe…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5r62-gj48-897x</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as `load_module`, `js_import`, and `js_content`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. In the lab, this allowed the user to load `ngx_http_js_module.so`, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is authenticated and is not OS command execution by itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `/mcp`
- `/mcp_message`
- MCP tool: `nginx_config_add`
- Nginx configuration validation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secondary authenticated user can bypass the restricted directive validation enforced by the HTTP API and execute attacker-controlled NJS inside the Nginx worker context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This may allow modification of Nginx runtime behavior, including responses, routing, headers, redirects, and request handling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Minimal PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Preconditions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Attacker has a secondary authenticated Nginx UI account.
- MCP is enabled.
- Nginx has NJS available:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
find / -name &amp;#34;ngx_http_js_module.so&amp;#34; 2&amp;gt;/dev/null
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Observed in the lab:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
/usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_js_module.so
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 1. HTTP API blocks the restricted config&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Request:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```http
POST /api/configs
Authorization: &amp;lt;SECONDARY_USER_JWT&amp;gt;
Content-Type: application/json
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Body:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```json
{
 &amp;#34;name&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;nginx.conf&amp;#34;,
 &amp;#34;base_dir&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;#34;,
 &amp;#34;overwrite&amp;#34;: true,
 &amp;#34;sync_node_ids&amp;#34;: [],
 &amp;#34;content&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;load_module…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as `load_module`, `js_import`, and `js_content`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. In the lab, this allowed the user to load `ngx_http_js_module.so`, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is authenticated and is not OS command execution by itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `/mcp`
- `/mcp_message`
- MCP tool: `nginx_config_add`
- Nginx configuration validation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secondary authenticated user can bypass the restricted directive validation enforced by the HTTP API and execute attacker-controlled NJS inside the Nginx worker context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This may allow modification of Nginx runtime behavior, including responses, routing, headers, redirects, and request handling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Minimal PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Preconditions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Attacker has a secondary authenticated Nginx UI account.
- MCP is enabled.
- Nginx has NJS available:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
find / -name &amp;#34;ngx_http_js_module.so&amp;#34; 2&amp;gt;/dev/null
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Observed in the lab:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
/usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_js_module.so
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 1. HTTP API blocks the restricted config&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Request:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```http
POST /api/configs
Authorization: &amp;lt;SECONDARY_USER_JWT&amp;gt;
Content-Type: application/json
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Body:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```json
{
 &amp;#34;name&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;nginx.conf&amp;#34;,
 &amp;#34;base_dir&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;#34;,
 &amp;#34;overwrite&amp;#34;: true,
 &amp;#34;sync_node_ids&amp;#34;: [],
 &amp;#34;content&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;load_module…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5r62-gj48-897x</guid>
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