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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 01:40:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90076</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90076</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90076</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90076</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90076</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 *
psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy
with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return
0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit
arithmetic, so q-&amp;gt;quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill
loop adds 0 to f-&amp;gt;credit (which stays &amp;lt;= 0) and goto begin loops
forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20] before multiplying so the product
cannot wrap, then cap the result at 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20, matching the bound already
enforced on TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in fq_change().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) is large enough that 2 * psched_mtu() wraps (e.g. a
dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 *
psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy
with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return
0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit
arithmetic, so q-&amp;gt;quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill
loop adds 0 to f-&amp;gt;credit (which stays &amp;lt;= 0) and goto begin loops
forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20] before multiplying so the product
cannot wrap, then cap the result at 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20, matching the bound already
enforced on TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in fq_change().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) is large enough that 2 * psched_mtu() wraps (e.g. a
dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90076</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6j38-2pg6-m9mv</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6j38-2pg6-m9mv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 *
psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy
with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return
0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit
arithmetic, so q-&amp;gt;quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill
loop adds 0 to f-&amp;gt;credit (which stays &amp;lt;= 0) and goto begin loops
forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20] before multiplying so the product
cannot wrap, then cap the result at 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20, matching the bound already
enforced on TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in fq_change().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) is large enough that 2 * psched_mtu() wraps (e.g. a
dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 *
psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy
with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return
0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit
arithmetic, so q-&amp;gt;quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill
loop adds 0 to f-&amp;gt;credit (which stays &amp;lt;= 0) and goto begin loops
forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20] before multiplying so the product
cannot wrap, then cap the result at 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20, matching the bound already
enforced on TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in fq_change().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) is large enough that 2 * psched_mtu() wraps (e.g. a
dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6j38-2pg6-m9mv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90076</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90076</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 * psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit arithmetic, so q-&amp;gt;quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill loop adds 0 to f-&amp;gt;credit (which stays &amp;lt;= 0) and goto begin loops forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup. Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20] before multiplying so the product cannot wrap, then cap the result at 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20, matching the bound already enforced on TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in fq_change(). Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus hard_header_len) is large enough that 2 * psched_mtu() wraps (e.g. a dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 * psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit arithmetic, so q-&amp;gt;quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill loop adds 0 to f-&amp;gt;credit (which stays &amp;lt;= 0) and goto begin loops forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup. Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20] before multiplying so the product cannot wrap, then cap the result at 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 20, matching the bound already enforced on TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in fq_change(). Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus hard_header_len) is large enough that 2 * psched_mtu() wraps (e.g. a dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90076</guid>
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