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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 19:42:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90220</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90220</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90220</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90220</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90220</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: seq: Don&amp;#39;t leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload
by pointing data.ext.ptr at it.  When that event is a queued
variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its
first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup().  The payload
goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address
reaches userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e (&amp;#34;ALSA: seq: Clear
variable event pointer on read&amp;#34;) removed from the event header.  The
read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the
payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read()
treats the header.  A stack copy is enough because delivery is
synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE,
queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and
reading the bounce back.  Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: seq: Don&amp;#39;t leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload
by pointing data.ext.ptr at it.  When that event is a queued
variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its
first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup().  The payload
goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address
reaches userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e (&amp;#34;ALSA: seq: Clear
variable event pointer on read&amp;#34;) removed from the event header.  The
read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the
payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read()
treats the header.  A stack copy is enough because delivery is
synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE,
queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and
reading the bounce back.  Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90220</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r7hx-2638-9jpm</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r7hx-2638-9jpm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: seq: Don&amp;#39;t leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload
by pointing data.ext.ptr at it.  When that event is a queued
variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its
first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup().  The payload
goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address
reaches userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e (&amp;#34;ALSA: seq: Clear
variable event pointer on read&amp;#34;) removed from the event header.  The
read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the
payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read()
treats the header.  A stack copy is enough because delivery is
synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE,
queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and
reading the bounce back.  Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: seq: Don&amp;#39;t leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload
by pointing data.ext.ptr at it.  When that event is a queued
variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its
first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup().  The payload
goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address
reaches userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e (&amp;#34;ALSA: seq: Clear
variable event pointer on read&amp;#34;) removed from the event header.  The
read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the
payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read()
treats the header.  A stack copy is enough because delivery is
synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE,
queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and
reading the bounce back.  Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r7hx-2638-9jpm</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90220</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90220</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 110 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Don&amp;#39;t leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload by pointing data.ext.ptr at it.  When that event is a queued variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup().  The payload goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address reaches userspace. That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e (&amp;#34;ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read&amp;#34;) removed from the event header.  The read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the payload. Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read() treats the header.  A stack copy is enough because delivery is synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning. An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE, queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and reading the bounce back.  Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 110 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Don&amp;#39;t leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload by pointing data.ext.ptr at it.  When that event is a queued variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup().  The payload goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address reaches userspace. That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e (&amp;#34;ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read&amp;#34;) removed from the event header.  The read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the payload. Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read() treats the header.  A stack copy is enough because delivery is synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning. An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE, queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and reading the bounce back.  Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90220</guid>
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