https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:49:55 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97228 <p>Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: &#34;...&#34;)` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator&#39;s own API key.</p> <p>Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator&#39;s own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator&#39;s own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`).</p> <p>Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: &#34;...&#34;)` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator&#39;s own API key.</p> <p>Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator&#39;s own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator&#39;s own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`).</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97228 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pwmm-7g3w-8pvp <p>Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: &#34;...&#34;)` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator&#39;s own API key.</p> <p>Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator&#39;s own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator&#39;s own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`).</p> <p>Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: &#34;...&#34;)` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator&#39;s own API key.</p> <p>Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator&#39;s own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator&#39;s own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`).</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pwmm-7g3w-8pvp