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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 17:51:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-97938</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97938</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;reboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid()
reads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of
the referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and
drop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has
loaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it,
causing a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to
kill_pid().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the
sysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in
pid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table
corrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the
underlying lifetime race.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read
sites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference
on the write side.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;call_rcu(&amp;amp;old_pid-&amp;gt;rcu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid()
also queues pid-&amp;gt;rcu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the
RCU callback list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Original KASAN crash stack:
  kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns()        # reads freed pid-&amp;gt;level
  kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr()          # calls pid_nr_ns()
  kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid()  # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;reboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid()
reads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of
the referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and
drop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has
loaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it,
causing a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to
kill_pid().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the
sysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in
pid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table
corrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the
underlying lifetime race.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read
sites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference
on the write side.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;call_rcu(&amp;amp;old_pid-&amp;gt;rcu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid()
also queues pid-&amp;gt;rcu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the
RCU callback list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Original KASAN crash stack:
  kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns()        # reads freed pid-&amp;gt;level
  kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr()          # calls pid_nr_ns()
  kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid()  # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97938</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9x8r-8wjj-jgjv</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9x8r-8wjj-jgjv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;reboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid()
reads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of
the referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and
drop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has
loaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it,
causing a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to
kill_pid().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the
sysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in
pid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table
corrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the
underlying lifetime race.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read
sites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference
on the write side.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;call_rcu(&amp;amp;old_pid-&amp;gt;rcu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid()
also queues pid-&amp;gt;rcu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the
RCU callback list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Original KASAN crash stack:
  kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns()        # reads freed pid-&amp;gt;level
  kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr()          # calls pid_nr_ns()
  kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid()  # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;reboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid()
reads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of
the referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and
drop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has
loaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it,
causing a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to
kill_pid().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the
sysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in
pid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table
corrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the
underlying lifetime race.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read
sites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference
on the write side.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;call_rcu(&amp;amp;old_pid-&amp;gt;rcu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid()
also queues pid-&amp;gt;rcu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the
RCU callback list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Original KASAN crash stack:
  kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns()        # reads freed pid-&amp;gt;level
  kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr()          # calls pid_nr_ns()
  kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid()  # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9x8r-8wjj-jgjv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-97938</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-97938</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: reboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race cad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid() reads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of the referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and drop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has loaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it, causing a use-after-free. kill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to kill_pid(). At the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the sysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in pid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table corrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the underlying lifetime race. Fix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read sites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference on the write side. call_rcu(&amp;amp;old_pid-&amp;gt;rcu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid() also queues pid-&amp;gt;rcu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the RCU callback list. Original KASAN crash stack:   kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns()        # reads freed pid-&amp;gt;level   kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr()          # calls pid_nr_ns()   kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid()  # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: reboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race cad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid() reads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of the referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and drop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has loaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it, causing a use-after-free. kill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to kill_pid(). At the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the sysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in pid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table corrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the underlying lifetime race. Fix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read sites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference on the write side. call_rcu(&amp;amp;old_pid-&amp;gt;rcu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid() also queues pid-&amp;gt;rcu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the RCU callback list. Original KASAN crash stack:   kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns()        # reads freed pid-&amp;gt;level   kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr()          # calls pid_nr_ns()   kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid()  # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-97938</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
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