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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:06:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-55485 — Piccolo Admin: Privilege escalation - admin to superuser via session-token disclosure in GET /api/tables/sessions/.</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55485</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; piccolo-orm piccolo_admin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Piccolo Admin is an admin interface and content management system for Python, built on top of Piccolo. Prior to 1.14.0, piccolo_admin/endpoints.py uses superuser_validators to block PUT, PATCH, DELETE, and POST requests by non-superusers but permits GET requests to configured user and session tables, while piccolo_api/session_auth/tables.py exposes SessionsBase.token because the token column is not secret. In deployments that add the Sessions and User tables to create_admin, a non-superuser administrator can call GET /api/tables/sessions/, obtain another user&amp;#39;s live session token, replay it as the Cookie id value to impersonate a superuser, and permanently set superuser to true on the attacker&amp;#39;s own row. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; piccolo-orm piccolo_admin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Piccolo Admin is an admin interface and content management system for Python, built on top of Piccolo. Prior to 1.14.0, piccolo_admin/endpoints.py uses superuser_validators to block PUT, PATCH, DELETE, and POST requests by non-superusers but permits GET requests to configured user and session tables, while piccolo_api/session_auth/tables.py exposes SessionsBase.token because the token column is not secret. In deployments that add the Sessions and User tables to create_admin, a non-superuser administrator can call GET /api/tables/sessions/, obtain another user&amp;#39;s live session token, replay it as the Cookie id value to impersonate a superuser, and permanently set superuser to true on the attacker&amp;#39;s own row. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55485</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3882 — piccolo-admin has a privilege escalation issue - admin to superuser via session-token disclosure in GET /api/tables/ses…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3882</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: piccolo-admin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`piccolo_admin` uses a helper called `superuser_validators` to gate access to the user and session tables for non-superusers. The helper rejects `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, and `POST`, but **does not reject `GET`**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `sessions` table stores live session tokens **in plaintext**, and the token column is not marked `secret=True`, so it is included in every `GET` response. Any non-superuser admin can therefore list every other user&amp;#39;s live session token with one request, replay the token as their own `Cookie: id=…`, impersonate that user (including the superuser), and then permanently self-promote by writing `superuser = true` on their own row.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The chain is reachable on a realistic, documented configuration: a deployer adds the `Sessions` (and `User`) tables to `create_admin([...])` so superusers have a UI to monitor and revoke sessions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **File**: `piccolo_admin/endpoints.py`
- **Function**: `superuser_validators` (around line 419)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def superuser_validators(piccolo_crud: PiccoloCRUD, request: Request):
    user: BaseUser = request.user.user
    if not user.superuser:
        if request.method.upper() in [&amp;#34;PUT&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;PATCH&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;DELETE&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;POST&amp;#34;]:
            raise HTTPException(
                detail=&amp;#34;Only superusers can perform these actions.&amp;#34;,
                status_code=405,
            )
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The method check is a **deny-list** instead of an **allow-list**; `GET` is absent. Compounding the issue, `SessionsBase.token` in `piccolo_api…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: piccolo-admin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`piccolo_admin` uses a helper called `superuser_validators` to gate access to the user and session tables for non-superusers. The helper rejects `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, and `POST`, but **does not reject `GET`**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `sessions` table stores live session tokens **in plaintext**, and the token column is not marked `secret=True`, so it is included in every `GET` response. Any non-superuser admin can therefore list every other user&amp;#39;s live session token with one request, replay the token as their own `Cookie: id=…`, impersonate that user (including the superuser), and then permanently self-promote by writing `superuser = true` on their own row.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The chain is reachable on a realistic, documented configuration: a deployer adds the `Sessions` (and `User`) tables to `create_admin([...])` so superusers have a UI to monitor and revoke sessions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **File**: `piccolo_admin/endpoints.py`
- **Function**: `superuser_validators` (around line 419)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def superuser_validators(piccolo_crud: PiccoloCRUD, request: Request):
    user: BaseUser = request.user.user
    if not user.superuser:
        if request.method.upper() in [&amp;#34;PUT&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;PATCH&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;DELETE&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;POST&amp;#34;]:
            raise HTTPException(
                detail=&amp;#34;Only superusers can perform these actions.&amp;#34;,
                status_code=405,
            )
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The method check is a **deny-list** instead of an **allow-list**; `GET` is absent. Compounding the issue, `SessionsBase.token` in `piccolo_api…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3882</guid>
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