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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0285 — TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rustsec-2026-0285</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: rustls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level
when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. For example,
a plaintext `EncryptedExtensions` message packed into the same record as the
`ServerHello` was accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RFC 8446 section 5.1 requires that handshake messages do not span key changes,
and that implementations terminate the connection with an &amp;#34;unexpected_message&amp;#34;
alert if they do.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker
cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that
a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext
without rustls rejecting the connection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is functionally the same bug as Go&amp;#39;s
[GO-2026-4340](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4340) (CVE-2025-61730).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: rustls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level
when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. For example,
a plaintext `EncryptedExtensions` message packed into the same record as the
`ServerHello` was accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RFC 8446 section 5.1 requires that handshake messages do not span key changes,
and that implementations terminate the connection with an &amp;#34;unexpected_message&amp;#34;
alert if they do.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker
cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that
a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext
without rustls rejecting the connection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is functionally the same bug as Go&amp;#39;s
[GO-2026-4340](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4340) (CVE-2025-61730).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rustsec-2026-0285</guid>
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