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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:08:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-22168 — OpenClaw has Windows system.run approval mismatch on cmd.exe /c trailing arguments</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-22168</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A Windows `system.run` approval-integrity mismatch in the `cmd.exe /c` path could allow trailing arguments to execute while approval/audit text reflected only a benign command string.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This requires an authenticated operator context using the approvals flow and a trusted Windows node.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Latest published vulnerable version (as of 2026-02-21): `2026.2.19-2`
- Vulnerable range: `&amp;lt;=2026.2.19-2`
- Patched version (planned next release): `2026.2.21`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Scenario
1. An authenticated operator approval is created for a benign command text (for example, `echo`).
2. A `system.run` request uses `cmd.exe /c` with extra trailing arguments.
3. Prior behavior could bind approval/audit text to the benign command while still executing the full argument tail on the node.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
- Local command execution on the trusted Windows node process account.
- Approval/audit command text integrity mismatch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix
- Canonicalize the full command tail after `cmd.exe /c`.
- Reuse one shared command canonicalization/validation path for validation, approval matching, and execution/audit text.
- Add regression coverage for trailing-argument smuggling and approval binding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)
- `6007941f04df1edcca679dd6c95949744fdbd4df`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.21`). Once that npm release is live, this advisory can be published directly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw thanks @t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A Windows `system.run` approval-integrity mismatch in the `cmd.exe /c` path could allow trailing arguments to execute while approval/audit text reflected only a benign command string.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This requires an authenticated operator context using the approvals flow and a trusted Windows node.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Latest published vulnerable version (as of 2026-02-21): `2026.2.19-2`
- Vulnerable range: `&amp;lt;=2026.2.19-2`
- Patched version (planned next release): `2026.2.21`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Scenario
1. An authenticated operator approval is created for a benign command text (for example, `echo`).
2. A `system.run` request uses `cmd.exe /c` with extra trailing arguments.
3. Prior behavior could bind approval/audit text to the benign command while still executing the full argument tail on the node.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
- Local command execution on the trusted Windows node process account.
- Approval/audit command text integrity mismatch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix
- Canonicalize the full command tail after `cmd.exe /c`.
- Reuse one shared command canonicalization/validation path for validation, approval matching, and execution/audit text.
- Add regression coverage for trailing-argument smuggling and approval binding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)
- `6007941f04df1edcca679dd6c95949744fdbd4df`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.21`). Once that npm release is live, this advisory can be published directly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw thanks @t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-22168</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-22168 — OpenClaw &lt; 2026.2.21 - Command Injection via cmd.exe /c Trailing Arguments in system.run</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-22168</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.21 contain an approval-integrity mismatch vulnerability in system.run that allows authenticated operators to execute arbitrary trailing arguments after cmd.exe /c while approval text reflects only a benign command. Attackers can smuggle malicious arguments through cmd.exe /c to achieve local command execution on trusted Windows nodes with mismatched audit logs.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.21 contain an approval-integrity mismatch vulnerability in system.run that allows authenticated operators to execute arbitrary trailing arguments after cmd.exe /c while approval text reflects only a benign command. Attackers can smuggle malicious arguments through cmd.exe /c to achieve local command execution on trusted Windows nodes with mismatched audit logs.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-22168</guid>
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