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      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-8cp7-rp8r-mg77 — OpenClaw has SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition over ISATAP</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-8cp7-rp8r-mg77</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
OpenClaw&amp;#39;s SSRF hostname/IP guard did not detect ISATAP embedded IPv4 addresses (`...:5efe:w.x.y.z`). A crafted URL containing an ISATAP IPv6 literal could embed a private IPv4 target (for example loopback) and bypass private-address filtering in URL-fetching paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity Assessment
Rated **medium**: the bug weakens SSRF protections in URL fetch flows, but impact depends on reaching a URL-fetching path with attacker-controlled input and is generally constrained to internal network access attempts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `&amp;gt;=2026.1.20 &amp;lt;=2026.2.17`
- Latest published at patch time: `2026.2.17`
- Patched release: `2026.2.19`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Security Policy Context
Per `SECURITY.md`, OpenClaw&amp;#39;s web/gateway surface is intended for local use by default, public internet exposure is out-of-scope, and prompt-injection reports are out-of-scope for bounty handling. This advisory tracks a core SSRF-guard bypass in fetch protections.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
This can permit SSRF-style access attempts to internal/private network targets through URL ingestion/fetch paths that rely on shared hostname/IP blocking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix
- Added RFC 5214 ISATAP embedded-IPv4 detection to the shared SSRF classifier.
- Centralized hostname/IP blocking through `isBlockedHostnameOrIp` and routed relevant validators to that shared path.
- Added regression tests for ISATAP private vs public embedded IPv4 handling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- `d51929ecb52fe65e90bf36795f4247feb29eb8…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
OpenClaw&amp;#39;s SSRF hostname/IP guard did not detect ISATAP embedded IPv4 addresses (`...:5efe:w.x.y.z`). A crafted URL containing an ISATAP IPv6 literal could embed a private IPv4 target (for example loopback) and bypass private-address filtering in URL-fetching paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity Assessment
Rated **medium**: the bug weakens SSRF protections in URL fetch flows, but impact depends on reaching a URL-fetching path with attacker-controlled input and is generally constrained to internal network access attempts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `&amp;gt;=2026.1.20 &amp;lt;=2026.2.17`
- Latest published at patch time: `2026.2.17`
- Patched release: `2026.2.19`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Security Policy Context
Per `SECURITY.md`, OpenClaw&amp;#39;s web/gateway surface is intended for local use by default, public internet exposure is out-of-scope, and prompt-injection reports are out-of-scope for bounty handling. This advisory tracks a core SSRF-guard bypass in fetch protections.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
This can permit SSRF-style access attempts to internal/private network targets through URL ingestion/fetch paths that rely on shared hostname/IP blocking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix
- Added RFC 5214 ISATAP embedded-IPv4 detection to the shared SSRF classifier.
- Centralized hostname/IP blocking through `isBlockedHostnameOrIp` and routed relevant validators to that shared path.
- Added regression tests for ISATAP private vs public embedded IPv4 handling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- `d51929ecb52fe65e90bf36795f4247feb29eb8…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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