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    <item>
      <title>BREW-asciidoctor-CVE-2026-53727 — Ruby CSS Parser: SSRF and Local File Disclosure in `CssParser::Parser#read_remote_file`</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-asciidoctor-cve-2026-53727</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: asciidoctor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`CssParser::Parser#read_remote_file` (and therefore `load_uri!`, and the `@import`-following branch of `add_block!`) issues HTTP/HTTPS requests against any host, port and URI it is handed, with no scheme allowlist, no host / IP filtering, and no protection against link-local, loopback or RFC‑1918 addresses. `Location:` redirects are followed recursively back into the same function, which **also services `file://` URIs**, so a single attacker-controlled HTTP redirect upgrades the bug from SSRF to arbitrary local file disclosure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In practice, any consumer of `css_parser` that hands it attacker‑influenced CSS together with a `base_uri:` option — Premailer being the canonical example — is exposed. The attacker only needs the ability to land one `@import url(...)` in the CSS that the host application parses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[`lib/css_parser/parser.rb#L613-L687`](https://github.com/premailer/css_parser/blob/cee10f16b11dd175f17b0e5f6aefa488378e964b/lib/css_parser/parser.rb#L613-L687):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
def read_remote_file(uri) # :nodoc:
  ...
  begin
    uri = Addressable::URI.parse(uri.to_s)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if uri.scheme == &amp;#39;file&amp;#39;
      # local file
      path = uri.path
      path.gsub!(%r{^/}, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;) if Gem.win_platform?
      src = File.read(path, mode: &amp;#39;rb&amp;#39;)        # &amp;lt;-- arbitrary local read
    else
      # remote file
      if uri.scheme == &amp;#39;https&amp;#39;
        uri.port = 443 unless uri.port
        http = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)
        http.use_ssl = true
      else…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: asciidoctor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`CssParser::Parser#read_remote_file` (and therefore `load_uri!`, and the `@import`-following branch of `add_block!`) issues HTTP/HTTPS requests against any host, port and URI it is handed, with no scheme allowlist, no host / IP filtering, and no protection against link-local, loopback or RFC‑1918 addresses. `Location:` redirects are followed recursively back into the same function, which **also services `file://` URIs**, so a single attacker-controlled HTTP redirect upgrades the bug from SSRF to arbitrary local file disclosure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In practice, any consumer of `css_parser` that hands it attacker‑influenced CSS together with a `base_uri:` option — Premailer being the canonical example — is exposed. The attacker only needs the ability to land one `@import url(...)` in the CSS that the host application parses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[`lib/css_parser/parser.rb#L613-L687`](https://github.com/premailer/css_parser/blob/cee10f16b11dd175f17b0e5f6aefa488378e964b/lib/css_parser/parser.rb#L613-L687):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
def read_remote_file(uri) # :nodoc:
  ...
  begin
    uri = Addressable::URI.parse(uri.to_s)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if uri.scheme == &amp;#39;file&amp;#39;
      # local file
      path = uri.path
      path.gsub!(%r{^/}, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;) if Gem.win_platform?
      src = File.read(path, mode: &amp;#39;rb&amp;#39;)        # &amp;lt;-- arbitrary local read
    else
      # remote file
      if uri.scheme == &amp;#39;https&amp;#39;
        uri.port = 443 unless uri.port
        http = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)
        http.use_ssl = true
      else…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-asciidoctor-cve-2026-53727</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53727 — css_parser: SSRF and Local File Disclosure in `CssParser::Parser#read_remote_file`</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53727</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; premailer css_parser&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;css_parser is a Ruby CSS parser. From 2.2.0 until 3.0.0, CssParser::Parser#read_remote_file in lib/css_parser/parser.rb, and therefore load_uri! and the @import-following branch of add_block!, issued HTTP and HTTPS requests against any host, port, and URI without a scheme allowlist, host or IP filtering, or protection against link-local, loopback, or RFC-1918 addresses. Location: redirects were followed recursively back into the same function, which also serviced file:// URIs, so a single attacker-controlled HTTP redirect could upgrade the bug from SSRF to arbitrary local file disclosure. Any consumer of css_parser that hands it attacker-influenced CSS together with a base_uri: option is exposed. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; premailer css_parser&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;css_parser is a Ruby CSS parser. From 2.2.0 until 3.0.0, CssParser::Parser#read_remote_file in lib/css_parser/parser.rb, and therefore load_uri! and the @import-following branch of add_block!, issued HTTP and HTTPS requests against any host, port, and URI without a scheme allowlist, host or IP filtering, or protection against link-local, loopback, or RFC-1918 addresses. Location: redirects were followed recursively back into the same function, which also serviced file:// URIs, so a single attacker-controlled HTTP redirect could upgrade the bug from SSRF to arbitrary local file disclosure. Any consumer of css_parser that hands it attacker-influenced CSS together with a base_uri: option is exposed. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53727</guid>
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