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      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-32972 — OpenClaw: `browser.request` let `operator.write` persist admin-only browser profile changes</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-32972</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authorization mismatch in the gateway let an authenticated caller with only `operator.write` use `browser.request` to reach browser profile management routes that persist configuration to disk. In practice, this exposed an admin-only configuration write primitive through `/profiles/create`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A write-scoped operator could create or modify browser profiles and store attacker-chosen remote CDP endpoints without holding `operator.admin`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`openclaw` `&amp;lt;= 2026.3.8`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `openclaw` `2026.3.11` and included in later releases such as `2026.3.12`. Browser profile creation now requires the correct admin boundary, and regression tests cover the write-vs-admin authorization split.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authorization mismatch in the gateway let an authenticated caller with only `operator.write` use `browser.request` to reach browser profile management routes that persist configuration to disk. In practice, this exposed an admin-only configuration write primitive through `/profiles/create`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A write-scoped operator could create or modify browser profiles and store attacker-chosen remote CDP endpoints without holding `operator.admin`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`openclaw` `&amp;lt;= 2026.3.8`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `openclaw` `2026.3.11` and included in later releases such as `2026.3.12`. Browser profile creation now requires the correct admin boundary, and regression tests cover the write-vs-admin authorization split.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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