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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 13:59:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-krane-CVE-2026-45363 — ruby-jwt: Empty-key HMAC bypass; cross-language sibling of CVE-2026-44351</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-krane-cve-2026-45363</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: krane&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`JWT.decode(token, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, true, algorithm: &amp;#39;HS256&amp;#39;)` accepts an attacker-forged token.
`OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(&amp;#39;SHA256&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, payload)` returns a valid digest under an empty key, and no `raise
  InvalidKeyError if key.empty?` precondition exists in the HMAC algorithm.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
JWT.decode(token, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, true, algorithm: &amp;#39;HS256&amp;#39;)
  -&amp;gt; JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, ...)
  -&amp;gt; OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(&amp;#39;SHA256&amp;#39;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, signing_input) == signature
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same path is reached when a keyfinder block or key_finder: argument returns &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, nil, or an
array containing nil for an unknown key. JWT::Decode#find_key only rejects literal nil and empty
arrays, and JWT::JWA::Hmac silently coerces nil to &amp;#34;&amp;#34; (signing_key ||= &amp;#39;&amp;#39;) before signing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
JWT.decode(token, nil, true, algorithms: [&amp;#39;HS256&amp;#39;]) { |_h| &amp;#34;&amp;#34; }
  -&amp;gt; find_key returns &amp;#34;&amp;#34;               # &amp;#34;&amp;#34; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !Array(&amp;#34;&amp;#34;).empty? == true
  -&amp;gt; JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, ...)
  -&amp;gt; verifies
```
Common application patterns that produce the unsafe value: `redis.get(&amp;#34;kid:#{kid}&amp;#34;).to_s`, ORM string columns with `default: &amp;#39;&amp;#39;`, `ENV[&amp;#39;SECRET&amp;#39;] || &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, Hash.new(&amp;#39;&amp;#39;)` lookups, [primary, fallback] where fallback may be nil. Applications passing a non-empty static key:, or whose keyfinder returns nil / raises on miss, are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing `enforce_hmac_key_length` option would block this but defaults to false. On OpenSSL ≥ 3.5 the empty-key HMAC.digest call no longer raises, so the OpenSSL-3.0 rescue in JWA::Hmac#sign does not fire.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affects HS256/HS384/H…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: krane&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`JWT.decode(token, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, true, algorithm: &amp;#39;HS256&amp;#39;)` accepts an attacker-forged token.
`OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(&amp;#39;SHA256&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, payload)` returns a valid digest under an empty key, and no `raise
  InvalidKeyError if key.empty?` precondition exists in the HMAC algorithm.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
JWT.decode(token, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, true, algorithm: &amp;#39;HS256&amp;#39;)
  -&amp;gt; JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, ...)
  -&amp;gt; OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(&amp;#39;SHA256&amp;#39;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, signing_input) == signature
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same path is reached when a keyfinder block or key_finder: argument returns &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, nil, or an
array containing nil for an unknown key. JWT::Decode#find_key only rejects literal nil and empty
arrays, and JWT::JWA::Hmac silently coerces nil to &amp;#34;&amp;#34; (signing_key ||= &amp;#39;&amp;#39;) before signing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
JWT.decode(token, nil, true, algorithms: [&amp;#39;HS256&amp;#39;]) { |_h| &amp;#34;&amp;#34; }
  -&amp;gt; find_key returns &amp;#34;&amp;#34;               # &amp;#34;&amp;#34; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !Array(&amp;#34;&amp;#34;).empty? == true
  -&amp;gt; JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, ...)
  -&amp;gt; verifies
```
Common application patterns that produce the unsafe value: `redis.get(&amp;#34;kid:#{kid}&amp;#34;).to_s`, ORM string columns with `default: &amp;#39;&amp;#39;`, `ENV[&amp;#39;SECRET&amp;#39;] || &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, Hash.new(&amp;#39;&amp;#39;)` lookups, [primary, fallback] where fallback may be nil. Applications passing a non-empty static key:, or whose keyfinder returns nil / raises on miss, are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing `enforce_hmac_key_length` option would block this but defaults to false. On OpenSSL ≥ 3.5 the empty-key HMAC.digest call no longer raises, so the OpenSSL-3.0 rescue in JWA::Hmac#sign does not fire.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affects HS256/HS384/H…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-krane-cve-2026-45363</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-45363 — `jwt` (Ruby gem) - empty-key HMAC bypass</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45363</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jwt ruby-jwt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ruby-jwt is a Ruby implementation of the RFC 7519 OAuth JSON Web Token standard. Prior to 2.10.3 and 3.2.0, JWT.decode(token, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, true, algorithm: &amp;#39;HS256&amp;#39;) accepts an attacker-forged token because OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(&amp;#39;SHA256&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, payload) returns a valid digest under an empty key and no empty-key precondition exists in the HMAC algorithm. The same path is reached when a keyfinder block or key_finder: argument returns an empty string, nil, or an array containing nil for an unknown key, affecting HS256, HS384, and HS512 verification through JWT.decode and JWT::EncodedToken#verify_signature!. This issue is fixed in versions 2.10.3 and 3.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jwt ruby-jwt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ruby-jwt is a Ruby implementation of the RFC 7519 OAuth JSON Web Token standard. Prior to 2.10.3 and 3.2.0, JWT.decode(token, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, true, algorithm: &amp;#39;HS256&amp;#39;) accepts an attacker-forged token because OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(&amp;#39;SHA256&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, payload) returns a valid digest under an empty key and no empty-key precondition exists in the HMAC algorithm. The same path is reached when a keyfinder block or key_finder: argument returns an empty string, nil, or an array containing nil for an unknown key, affecting HS256, HS384, and HS512 verification through JWT.decode and JWT::EncodedToken#verify_signature!. This issue is fixed in versions 2.10.3 and 3.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45363</guid>
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