https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:46:07 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-32917 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>### Summary `openclaw` versions `&lt;= 2026.3.12` accepted unsanitized iMessage remote attachment paths when staging files over SCP, allowing shell metacharacters in the remote path operand.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (`npm`) - Affected versions: `&lt;= 2026.3.12` - Fixed version: `2026.3.13`</p> <p>### Details The vulnerable path was the remote attachment staging flow in `src/auto-reply/reply/stage-sandbox-media.ts`. When `ctx.MediaRemoteHost` was set, OpenClaw staged the attachment by spawning `/usr/bin/scp` against `&lt;remoteHost&gt;:&lt;remotePath&gt;`. In affected releases, the remote host was normalized but the remote attachment path was not validated for shell metacharacters before being passed to the SCP remote operand. A sender-controlled iMessage attachment filename containing shell metacharacters could therefore trigger command execution on the configured remote host when remote attachment staging was enabled.</p> <p>This issue is in scope under OpenClaw&#39;s trust model because it crosses an inbound content boundary into host command execution on a configured remote attachment host.</p> <p>### Fix `openclaw@2026.3.13` validates the SCP remote path before spawning `scp`. Current code calls `normalizeScpRemotePath(...)` and rejects paths containing shell metacharacters instead of passing them through to the remote shell.</p> <p>Regression coverage exists in `src/auto-reply/reply.stage-sandbox-media.scp-remote-path.test.ts` (`rejects remote attachment filenames with shell metachar…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>### Summary `openclaw` versions `&lt;= 2026.3.12` accepted unsanitized iMessage remote attachment paths when staging files over SCP, allowing shell metacharacters in the remote path operand.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (`npm`) - Affected versions: `&lt;= 2026.3.12` - Fixed version: `2026.3.13`</p> <p>### Details The vulnerable path was the remote attachment staging flow in `src/auto-reply/reply/stage-sandbox-media.ts`. When `ctx.MediaRemoteHost` was set, OpenClaw staged the attachment by spawning `/usr/bin/scp` against `&lt;remoteHost&gt;:&lt;remotePath&gt;`. In affected releases, the remote host was normalized but the remote attachment path was not validated for shell metacharacters before being passed to the SCP remote operand. A sender-controlled iMessage attachment filename containing shell metacharacters could therefore trigger command execution on the configured remote host when remote attachment staging was enabled.</p> <p>This issue is in scope under OpenClaw&#39;s trust model because it crosses an inbound content boundary into host command execution on a configured remote attachment host.</p> <p>### Fix `openclaw@2026.3.13` validates the SCP remote path before spawning `scp`. Current code calls `normalizeScpRemotePath(...)` and rejects paths containing shell metacharacters instead of passing them through to the remote shell.</p> <p>Regression coverage exists in `src/auto-reply/reply.stage-sandbox-media.scp-remote-path.test.ts` (`rejects remote attachment filenames with shell metachar…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-32917