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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-55764 — Klever-Go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55764</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; klever-io klever-go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue &amp;lt;= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; klever-io klever-go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue &amp;lt;= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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