https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 08 Oct 2026 19:51:08 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-ghsa-w235-7p84-xx57 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: jupyterlab</p> <p>### Summary Tornado’s `curl_httpclient.CurlAsyncHTTPClient` class is vulnerable to CRLF (carriage return/line feed) injection in the request headers.</p> <p>### Details When an HTTP request is sent using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`, Tornado does not reject carriage return (\r) or line feed (\n) characters in the request headers. As a result, if an application includes an attacker-controlled header value in a request sent using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`, the attacker can inject arbitrary headers into the request or cause the application to send arbitrary requests to the specified server.</p> <p>This behavior differs from that of the standard `AsyncHTTPClient` class, which does reject CRLF characters.</p> <p>This issue appears to stem from libcurl&#39;s (as well as pycurl&#39;s) lack of validation for the [`HTTPHEADER`](https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER.html) option. libcurl’s documentation states:</p> <p>&gt; The headers included in the linked list must not be CRLF-terminated, because libcurl adds CRLF after each header item itself. Failure to comply with this might result in strange behavior. libcurl passes on the verbatim strings you give it, without any filter or other safe guards. That includes white space and control characters.</p> <p>pycurl similarly appears to assume that the headers adhere to the correct format. Therefore, without any validation on Tornado’s part, header names and values are included verbatim in the request sent by `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`, including any control characters that have special m…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: jupyterlab</p> <p>### Summary Tornado’s `curl_httpclient.CurlAsyncHTTPClient` class is vulnerable to CRLF (carriage return/line feed) injection in the request headers.</p> <p>### Details When an HTTP request is sent using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`, Tornado does not reject carriage return (\r) or line feed (\n) characters in the request headers. As a result, if an application includes an attacker-controlled header value in a request sent using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`, the attacker can inject arbitrary headers into the request or cause the application to send arbitrary requests to the specified server.</p> <p>This behavior differs from that of the standard `AsyncHTTPClient` class, which does reject CRLF characters.</p> <p>This issue appears to stem from libcurl&#39;s (as well as pycurl&#39;s) lack of validation for the [`HTTPHEADER`](https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER.html) option. libcurl’s documentation states:</p> <p>&gt; The headers included in the linked list must not be CRLF-terminated, because libcurl adds CRLF after each header item itself. Failure to comply with this might result in strange behavior. libcurl passes on the verbatim strings you give it, without any filter or other safe guards. That includes white space and control characters.</p> <p>pycurl similarly appears to assume that the headers adhere to the correct format. Therefore, without any validation on Tornado’s part, header names and values are included verbatim in the request sent by `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`, including any control characters that have special m…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-ghsa-w235-7p84-xx57