https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 16:44:49 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3537 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents</p> <p># PraisonAI `AgentTeam.launch()` exposes unauthenticated remote agent invocation endpoints</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>PraisonAI&#39;s documented Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` HTTP server starts externally reachable agent invocation endpoints without any authentication enforcement.</p> <p>The current implementation registers `GET /{path}/list`, `POST /{path}`, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}` routes. The POST routes directly call `agent.chat(...)`. Requests with no `Authorization` header are accepted, and requests with an obviously wrong bearer token are also accepted. The default Python API bind host for `Agents.launch()` is `0.0.0.0`, and official documentation shows `host=&#34;0.0.0.0&#34;` for remote access.</p> <p>This is a sibling/incomplete-fix variant of PraisonAI&#39;s prior unauthenticated API server and call server advisory family. Nearby server surfaces were hardened to require tokens, fail closed, or bind locally by default, but the `AgentTeam.launch()` FastAPI path still exposes unauthenticated agent execution on current upstream main and the latest release.</p> <p>This report is scoped to the Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` route-registration path. It does not require adjudicating whether the separate `praisonai serve agents --api-key` CLI path is correctly enforced.</p> <p>## Affected Components</p> <p>- Package: `praisonaiagents` - Current upstream main tested: `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1` - Latest release tag tested: `v4.6.57` - Primary file: `src/praisonai-agents/praisona…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents</p> <p># PraisonAI `AgentTeam.launch()` exposes unauthenticated remote agent invocation endpoints</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>PraisonAI&#39;s documented Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` HTTP server starts externally reachable agent invocation endpoints without any authentication enforcement.</p> <p>The current implementation registers `GET /{path}/list`, `POST /{path}`, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}` routes. The POST routes directly call `agent.chat(...)`. Requests with no `Authorization` header are accepted, and requests with an obviously wrong bearer token are also accepted. The default Python API bind host for `Agents.launch()` is `0.0.0.0`, and official documentation shows `host=&#34;0.0.0.0&#34;` for remote access.</p> <p>This is a sibling/incomplete-fix variant of PraisonAI&#39;s prior unauthenticated API server and call server advisory family. Nearby server surfaces were hardened to require tokens, fail closed, or bind locally by default, but the `AgentTeam.launch()` FastAPI path still exposes unauthenticated agent execution on current upstream main and the latest release.</p> <p>This report is scoped to the Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` route-registration path. It does not require adjudicating whether the separate `praisonai serve agents --api-key` CLI path is correctly enforced.</p> <p>## Affected Components</p> <p>- Package: `praisonaiagents` - Current upstream main tested: `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1` - Latest release tag tested: `v4.6.57` - Primary file: `src/praisonai-agents/praisona…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3537